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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
When speaking of Africa, often what comes to mind is the image of a 
continent wrapped in tradition and mystique; a continent confronted with 
innumerable crisis. 
Our theoretical motivation for this project lay within the field of philoso-
phy. Our attention was drawn to the discipline of philosophy itself and 
the very concept of philosophy. Philosophy on a global scale is usually 
referred to as the philosophy of the East and West. We know of philoso-
phical traditions throughout the Asian continent, from India to Japan, and 
are obviously all familiar with the Western philosophical discipline, 
which has its roots in ancient Greece. However, we were questioning 
whether philosophy global term could be deducted solely from those two 
continents. The question whether an African philosophy exists was there-
fore intriguing, as it seemed as something unexplored or at least not often 
spoken of. Given the vastness of the African continent with its many dif-
ferent nations, cultures and languages we posed the question as to 
whether one could find a distinct African philosophy. Our interest and cu-
riosity was stirred when we set out on our quest to ‘find’ this philosophy 
and see if it even existed. We found that the philosophy taking place in 
this cultural context was indeed rather obscure.  
 
We were haunted by questions as to why we had never heard of a thing 
called “African Philosophy”. Furthermore, what is especially African 
about it?  In the process of this project we have discovered the complex-
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ity of the complexity of this question, and thus seen how and why it has 
had a hard time getting recognition as a discipline.  
 
1.2 Problem definition 
In this project we wish to shed light on the ontological of African phi-
losophy. It seems as if the history of African Philosophy is strongly 
linked to the history of Africa itself. Our hypothesis is that there has been 
a strong development from when philosophy as a discipline first emerged 
in the 1960s to what is has become in the 1980s. Because of the political 
and societal changes the continent has undergone, it may have influences 
the different views on the subject of African philosophy. Our task is to 
investigate how and where the differences lie. 
 
We therefore wish to make a brief introduction to the very complicated 
occurrence of historical and political events of relevance, which the con-
tinent has been subject to. We do this by introducing African history in 
general, and also the history of African traditional thought.  
 
We then wish to analyse two texts from the 1960s by John Mbiti African 
religions and philosophy (1969) and W.E. Abraham’s The Mind of Africa 
(1962); as well as two texts from the 1980s by P. Hountondji’s What can 
philosophy do (1987) and P.O. Bodunrin’ The question of African Phi-
losophy (1981)  
 
The reason we have chosen these texts are because due to the background 
knowledge we have acquired, we find them reasonable representatives of 
African Philosophy in respectively the 1960s and the 1980s 
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 We have thus formulated the following questions: 
 
Cardinal question: 
What is the nature of the African philosophical tradition? 
 
Working questions: 
 
By making use of hermeneutic analysis, what meaning can we extract 
from four texts written by African philosophers? 
 
How has the concept of African philosophy changed from the 1960s to 
the 1980s? How can these changes be seen in accordance with the histori-
cal context? 
 
How can we speak of a unified African philosophy taking the vast diver-
sity of different languages and cultures on the African continent into con-
sideration?  
 
How has the West influenced philosophy in the African historically and 
cultural context?  
 
Who are the “African Philosophers” and where does this “African Phi-
losophy” take place?  
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1.3 Theory and Method 
Using theoretical and methodological knowledge about the technique of 
hermeneutics, we will examine the field of African Philosophy. Using 
this method we can provide a better understanding of our analysed texts. 
Our hypothesis is that by adding a historical and sociological dimension, 
we will be able to provide a deeper understanding of the nature of African 
Philosophy.  
  
1.4 Delimitations 
Even though we found the field of “African Philosophy” very interesting 
and exciting, we also found it to be very complicated and ambiguous. 
When researching for this project we realised that the field of African 
philosophy was more a debate on the nature of its very existence, than an 
actual set concept, because of it’s dynamic nature. When narrowing down 
in order to find a focus all imaginable possibilities were taken into con-
sideration. One option could have been to choose to focus on specific 
concepts, such as the concept of death, within the context of the discipline 
of African philosophy. Also the possibility of making a comparative 
study of the so-called African traditional philosophy with Western phi-
losophy was taken into consideration, but realising its magnitude our at-
tention was moved elsewhere.  
 
Seeing that all discussions tended to lead back to what the nature of Afri-
can Philosophy really was, we ended up choosing four texts of different 
African philosophers each representing a different view on what African 
philosophy is about, expressed in two decades within the 20th century. 
 
Given the size of the African continent and the difficulty of defining the 
borders and regions, we decided to focus on the philosophical debate on 
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the African continent limited to the sub-Saharan area. It seemed as if the 
history of African philosophy is strongly connected to the history of the 
African continent, therefore we include a historical background.  
Though we do go into the historical development of the African conti-
nent, we will not concern ourselves with a more thorough elaboration on 
the historical events, even though we do consider them of significantly 
relevance in relation to our problem area.  
 
 Besides the nature of African philosophy, the significance of language 
and its significance to a person’s perception of reality has also been a 
widely debated topic in philosophy as well as cultural studies. However, 
we have chosen not to further investigate this aspect of language. 
 
Furthermore we will not go thoroughly into the many concepts of phi-
losophy, though we do use some in accordance to the analysis and discus-
sion on the idea of African philosophy.  
 
When conducting research for this project we found a lot of reference to 
Marxism, but decided not elaborate on the effects of this theory on the 
African society as well as African Philosophy. 
  
1.5 Dimensions 
In this project we cover the dimension of Humanities, Science and Phi-
losophy. The problem addressed in the project is of a philosophical nature 
and pertain the aspect of philosophy and theory of science. We are deal-
ing with a philosophical reflection on the idea of culture and the context 
of these reflections. 
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We do this by focussing on epistemological questions such as the ques-
tion of knowledge and truth, through philosophical reflection on the dif-
ferent definitions of African philosophy as it is portrayed and debated 
within what is considered to be philosophical literature. 
 
 Furthermore we go beyond the “pure” philosophical, showing insight 
into historical and sociological matters, which relates to the questions we 
are addressing, in order to understand how the work of scholars within 
the field has been perceived throughout the period of time, we are dealing 
with. Our reflection on questions such as the definition of African phi-
losophy also leads to reflection upon the theories and methods used in 
other humanistic disciplines, like anthropology.  
 
We also cover the dimension of History and Culture, since we in the her-
meneutic analysis of the different texts are relating it to the historical con-
text of which it has been written. Consequently we get into the historical 
process of the past for the area in question. Furthermore we are dealing 
with a cross-cultural debate exerted by people of different origin and de-
cent. The sources we are dealing with are also of cultural matter in the 
sense that they are dealing with the attempt to define a culture and a past 
philosophy in an African context. 
 
In the project we investigate the academic field of African philosophy 
from all sides, especially how theory, method and technique work to-
gether. The semester-theme The State of the Art is thereby covered in our 
project because we account for the state of philosophy in Africa. 
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1.6 Report structure 
In the first chapter we have introduced our field of interest, what the re-
port is about and how we are going to shed light on the subject of African 
philosophy. 
 
In the second chapter on hermeneutics we give a brief theoretical over-
view based on important theorists like Gaddamer and Heidegger’s ap-
proach to hermeneutics. Then we have used Steinar Kvale’s InterView to 
outline the hermeneutic circle as a method for analysing texts. We con-
tinue to elaborate on how hermeneutics should be used in theory and how 
we have used it in practice. 
 
Chapter three gives a historical overview of the development of African 
philosophy and the cultural-historical context in which it arose. We out-
line the development from pre-colonial times up unto the 1980s. Parallel 
to these developments we simultaneously describe the development of 
African philosophy in its academic environment.  
 
In chapter four we present our analysis of our four philosophical texts. 
The analysis is structured according to a time frame. We first look at the 
texts written in the 1960’s, followed by analysing our texts from the 
1980’s. We analyse these by means of hermeneutics, by extracting 
themes from the texts.  
 
In chapter five we discuss the themes, or meanings, found when analys-
ing, also taking into consideration the historical, social and cultural issues 
and developments as described in chapter two.  
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In chapter six, our reflection chapter, we firstly take a critical stance to-
ward our sources used in the writing of this project. On the Theory of sci-
ence, we reflect upon our role as researchers and how hermeneutics is 
also present on a meta-level. Lastly we describe how our group process 
has progressed throughout the semester. 
 
Lastly we conclude upon the discussion as well as the entire report in 
chapter seven, by reflecting on our original working questions. 
 
We have included two appendixes to support some of the arguments pre-
sented in the project as well as providing additional information. 
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 Chapter Two - Hermeneutics as Theoretical and 
Methodological Framework 
 
 
In this chapter we will account for the theory on which the hermeneutic 
circle and method is based, as well as how we will use it in the textual 
analysis.  
When studying hermeneutics as a theory, we primarily draw on Rad-
nitzky’s Contemporary Schools of Metascience (1968) and Dermot 
Moran’s Introduction to Phenomenology (1999). In order to understand 
the method of hermeneutics, we have used Steinar Kvale’s book Inter-
View – En Introduktion til det Kvalitative Forskningsinterview (1997)1. 
Though this book is written for interview analysis, we still find it relevant 
because Kvale treats the interview as a text and since we are doing textual 
analysis, his method applies to us as well.  
At the end of this chapter we will explain how we have used Kvale’s ver-
sion of the hermeneutic circle in our analysis.  
 
 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Hermeneutics has developed due to the difficulty of understanding and 
interpreting texts (Radnitzky, 1970). Historically hermeneutics can be 
traced back to the very first interpretations of the Scripture, as it was a 
theory and method meant to interpret the Bible, and because the text was 
seen as the word of God, the importance of reading the text in the correct 
manner was emphasized. This was done by looking at the single sen-
tences and then interpreting them in light of the text as a whole. The in-
                                                 
1 The English title of this book is InterViews.  
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terpreter should try to find the right meaning of the text instead of search-
ing for his own understanding (Moran, 1999). 
 
During the late Medieval Ages hermeneutics acquired another function, 
as it was applied directly to the interpretation of legal judgments, such as 
testimonies, which dealt with the text as an object for interpretation.  
Renaissance humanists dealing with philology2 also used hermeneutic 
principles, yet it was the Reformation that caused a vast expansion of 
hermeneutics as both Catholic and Protestant theologians argued how to 
interpret the text of the Bible. Whereas Catholics advocated for the inter-
pretation presented by Church authorities (the Pope and Bishops etc.), 
Protestants emphasized the importance of the individual interpretation of 
the text.  
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer3 and Wilhelm Dilthey4, who have been influential 
in defining hermeneutics as a theory, both consider the Protestant Refor-
mation the beginning of modern hermeneutics (Moran, 1999). During the 
Reformation Martin Luther and other reformers claimed that the interpre-
tations of the Scripture were too dominated by the Church. Thus they 
broke with the old dogma of the traditional church, that one has to know 
about the tradition of the Church and the society in order to understand 
                                                 
2 By this we mean the study of literature, and the study of relationships between lan-
guages based on the analysis of texts.  
3 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), studied philosophy and philology, and later also 
phenomenology as a student of Martin Heidegger. One of his important works is 
Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method) from 1960, Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, London: Routledge. Retrieved May 26, 2006, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD021SECT1 
4 Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), studied theology at Heidelberg and Berlin and has 
taught at Basil, Kiel and Breslau, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: 
Routledge. Retrieved May 26, 2006, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DC020SECT1 
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the Scripture (Gadamer 1989) or any other text for that matter. This 
means that today there is no difference between interpreting sacred and 
secular texts, and therefore there is only one hermeneutics, which pos-
sesses the whole repertoire of historical research.  
 
In the Enlightenment period in the nineteenth century hermeneutics as a 
philosophical technique, changed its form with Friedrich Schleier-
macher5, who since has been called the founder of modern hermeneutics. 
Schleiermacher sought to uncover the true and original meaning of texts 
and in order to do this he claimed that all the layers of misunderstandings 
must be removed. He emphasized psychological empathy, which is put-
ting one-self in the mind of the writer, as being essential for understand-
ing; a “technique” which has since been criticized by Gadamer (Moran, 
1999).    
 
Schleiermacher and his work inspired Dilthey. They were both part of the 
German Romanticism movement, which dealt with art, philosophy and 
culture in German speaking countries in the nineteenth century. They put 
forward the idea, that the interpreter could add new meaning to a text. 
Furthermore Dilthey claimed that the historical context in this process 
was significant for the meaning formation. He also wanted to extend the 
subject of interpretation to the wider problem of understanding: Only an 
understanding of history that has been penetrated by philosophical in-
sight can provide the proper background for a general hermeneutics 
(Dilthey, 1996:3). Dilthey, as Schleiermacher, wanted hermeneutics to be 
                                                 
5 lived from 1768-1834; he was a German Protestant theologian and a philosopher of 
religion; retrieved at: Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University press. Roskilde 
Universitetsbibliotek. 28 May 2006 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=t116.e
2277> 
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a general method for all the disciplines within social sciences, namely for 
Geistenwissenschaften, (or cultural studies according to Radnitzky 
(1970)), which stood in opposition to Naturwissenschaften6 (Moran, 
1999:275). 
  
Martin Heidegger7 was very much inspired by Dilthey, but used herme-
neutics to mean the whole manner in which human existence is interpre-
tative (Moran, 1999:235). This way, hermeneutics came to focus on exis-
tence and understanding instead of mere interpretation, an idea already 
introduced by Dilthey. For example he examines the way our pre-
understanding affects the way of questioning, recognizing that the answer 
we receive depends on the way we formulate the question. Our average 
pre-understanding can be of false character and influenced by traditional 
theories, and therefore be of hindrance for what one wants to learn, as the 
answer is coloured by the knowledge we already possess. Therefore one 
must examine one’s initial self-understanding first and realise that much 
of our knowledge is of average quality.  
Heidegger distinguishes between authenticity and in-authenticity and 
claims that we live most of our lives in an in-authentic way when we try 
to gather our lives together in the everyday life and thus making it a 
whole. These ideas are closely connected to phenomenology (Moran, 
1999).  
 
Being a student of Heidegger, Gadamer came to engage himself pro-
foundly in hermeneutics and phenomenology, which he saw as clearly re-
                                                 
6 The natural sciences 
7 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976),has a doctorate in philosophy and in 1927 he pub-
lished Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) which is regarded his most important work. 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved May 26, 2006, 
from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD027SECT1    
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lated because they both describe the process of meaning. He clearly dis-
tinguished between hermeneutics as a Protestant theology and hermeneu-
tics in the modern period. He was fascinated by Heidegger’s idea of un-
derstanding being challenged by cultural and historical facets; and he saw 
hermeneutics as an ongoing, never completable process of understanding 
(Moran, 1999: 249). To him language is the medium of the hermeneutic 
experience (Moran, 1999: 249) and understanding must be realised 
through language. Language is also the place where matters reveal them-
selves (Moran, 1999).  
 
Gadamer is influenced by Dilthey’s cultural-historical approach to her-
meneutics, but opposes his view that hermeneutics characterises the 
method of Geisteswissenschaften, which is mainly concerned with texts. 
Instead he sees hermeneutics as being apparent in all aspects of human 
life and understanding, and everything sciences, arts and history all be-
long to one hermeneutic universe (Moran, 1999:279). Hermeneutics is a 
universal aspect of philosophy (Moran, 1999:251).          
 
Gadamer (1989) also sees hermeneutics as deriving from two different 
pathways, theology and philology. Theological, in the sense that herme-
neutics has been a tool in understanding and interpreting the Scripture. As 
well as in a philological sense, because hermeneutics arose as a reaction 
to the humanist claim to revive classical literature, which had been domi-
nated by the Christian Church before the Reformation (Gadamer 1989).  
 
Radnitzky (1970) describes how two opposed ideals have emerged as a 
response to the claim for developing a method for an “intersubjectively 
valid” thematisation of the meaning of texts etc. (Radnitzky, 1970, vol. 
II:30).  
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Those ideals are respectively the historistic (positivistic), and the existen-
tialistic-hermeneutics (Radnitzky, 1970, vol. II:30). According to the his-
toristic ideal one must be as scientifically objective as possible; therefore 
analytic philosophy seems to fall under the term Geistewissenschaften, 
because this too is required to avoid existential consequences. The aim of 
historistic ideals is to objectify the meaning of a text – to be value-neutral 
(Radnitzky 1970). In fact the interpreter of the text need not even take 
any responsibility regarding truth claims and acceptability of statements 
(Radnitzky 1970).  
The existentialistic-hermeneutic idea arose as a critical reaction to the his-
toristic ideal. Basically it criticises the historistic historians’ naiveté and 
the repression of the awareness of historical engagement of the inter-
preter, seeing this struggles for objectivity. Existentialistic-hermeneutics 
believes that there is no neutral standpoint outside of history upon which 
the cultural scientist could base himself (Radnitzky 1970, Vol. II:32).  
 
In conclusion the theory and method behind hermeneutics has changed 
throughout time. At first it was a means for interpreting solely on a tex-
tual level, but later came to include discourses as long as they are inter-
preted as texts. Furthermore, hermeneutics has developed into including 
an understanding of other aspects than the text, for instance the author 
and context in which it was written. Not least it includes other sciences 
such as art, history and not least philosophy.   
We conclude our theoretical framework on Hermeneutics believing that it 
is best described by Heidegger’s idea of hermeneutics as ‘being-in-the-
world’, which implies that we know things not in their eternal essence, 
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but only in the meaning they have in a given situation (Sheehan, 1998, 
2003)8. Therefore time is the meaning of all being. 
 
 
2.2. Methodological Framework 
Hermeneutics is the study of textual interpretation, and the ultimate pur-
pose is to reach an understanding of a text’s meaning of universal validity 
(Kvale, 1997). The procedure of understanding a text is characterised as a 
hermeneutic circle: The understanding of a text takes place in a process, 
where the meaning of the individual parts is determined by the overall 
meaning of the text as it is first perceived. Interpreting each individual 
component may change the original understanding of the text in entirety, 
which again, affects the meaning of the component parts (Kvale, 1997). 
So the hermeneutic interpretation of a text is in principal a never-ending 
process, yet in practice we as researchers can stop it once we find that we 
have reached a valid and uniform meaning without internal contradictions 
(Kvale, 1997).  
 
Five Principles of Hermeneutic Interpretation 
Kvale (1997) presents seven principles9 for hermeneutic interpretation of 
literary texts, which originates from G. Radnitzky’s (1970) description of 
the hermeneutic circle. 
 
The first principle concerns the continuous process between the compo-
nent parts and the whole. Kvale describes the process of the hermeneutic 
                                                 
8 Retrieved May 28, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD027  
9 Kvale presents seven principles for hermeneutic interpretation, however the two 
principles of them are not applicable to our textual analysis, as it primarily concerns 
itself with the physical setting of the interview.   
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circle as following: Med udgangspunkt i en ofte uklar og intuitiv forståel-
se af teksten som helhed fortolkes dens forskellige dele, og ud fra disse 
fortolkninger sættes delene på ny i relation til helheden osv.10 (Kvale, 
1997:58). This means that we will, in our analysis of our chosen texts, 
continuously relate our understanding of, respectively the whole text and 
fragments of the text, to each other in order to create new meanings.  
 
The second principle describes, as above, how the hermeneutic interpreta-
tion comes to an end once a uniform understanding of the text without 
contradictions has been reached (Kvale, 1997). This process is also re-
ferred to as tacking, and for as long as the process goes on we will con-
tinue to produce new knowledge (Radnitzky, 1970).  
 
In the third principle, the interpretations of the parts are related to the text 
as a whole, the so-called testing of the component parts. This may also 
involve testing the overall meaning(s) to other texts by the same author or 
texts of the same tradition (Radnitzky, 1970).  
 
Subsequently, in the fourth principle, Kvale (1997) underlines the impor-
tance of the autonomy of the text. This means that we must understand 
the text within its own framework, by interpreting what the text itself tells 
us about a subject or theme, disregarding by whom, when and where it 
was written. Radnitzky (1970) argues that we cannot rely on the text 
alone, and if we empathize with the author, we must focus on what the 
thoughts and sentences in the text are about.  
 
                                                 
10 With starting point in an often unclear and intuitive understanding of a text in en-
tirety, its components parts are interpreted, and from these interpretations the parts 
are once again once more put in relation to the whole etc.10
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The fifth and last principle we engage ourselves in concerns viden om 
tekstens emne 11(Kvale, 1997:59). As researchers we must posses a great 
deal of knowledge about the subject matter in order to shed light on dif-
ferent aspects of the text.  
 
Ad hoc 
In order to understand the text and create new meanings we do not follow 
the method of hermeneutics precisely, but implement what Kvale (1997) 
refers to as the ad hoc method. This implies using a variation of different 
tools and techniques in order to create meanings: as for example using the 
knowledge acquired in Chapter Tree and implementing it into our discus-
sion. The ad hoc method enables us to create free interplay between tech-
niques of analysis. This may include quantifications of assertions, point-
ing out themes, patterns and comparisons/contrasts etc. that are specific 
of our text (Kvale, 1997).  
 
 
2.3 How we apply Hermeneutics 
In understanding and creating meaning of our chosen texts we will only 
follow the standard method of hermeneutic analysis up to a certain point. 
As explained above we will turn to the ad hoc method, which will allow 
us to implement the principles in a way that suits our analysis. 
  
Therefore we have first of all engaged ourselves with the fifth principle 
concerning knowledge about the subject. Acknowledging that we only 
possessed limited foreknowledge about African philosophy, it was neces-
sary for us to gain knowledge in order to see a problem. This knowledge 
                                                 
11 Knowledge about the subject of the text. 
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is accounted for in Chapter three, where the discipline of African Phi-
losophy and its historical roots are investigated. This also includes the 
amount of background knowledge we have acquired, which is not neces-
sarily included in the report. With this established-knowledge and knowl-
edge-gaining experience now in a continuous process, we turned to the 
analysis.  
 
In the analysis meanings were extracted from the texts and afterwards 
placed into themes. We then continued to elaborate on the themes and 
briefly compared the statements within each theme, so that the third prin-
ciple about testing was fulfilled. The four texts are each written by differ-
ent authors; however they all belong to the same tradition, so-called Afri-
can philosophy. Thereby we could test the texts within the same tradition. 
However, a second testing occurs when the meaning extracted from the 
first testing, is applied to a new hermeneutic circle by putting them in re-
lation to our historical and social findings, thereby creating new meanings 
once again. When we reached an understanding that we found sufficient 
we chose to stop our hermeneutic process in accordance with the second 
principle.  
 
With regards to the autonomy of the texts we neither can, nor will disre-
gard the importance of the authors’ role in the timeframe in which the 
texts are written. These two facets are important because we are investi-
gating the development of opinions within a period of time, and within 
the different branches of African philosophy.  
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Chapter Three - Historical Introduction to African Phi-
losophical Thought 
 
 
By looking at the historical background of the African continent, we wish 
to get a better understanding of the development of African philosophy. 
African philosophy is historically associated with two happenings; West-
ern discourse on Africa, and the way Africans responded to it. Even 
though the nature of African philosophy has been discussed repeatedly, 
the core of the discussions seems to revolve around the notion of reason, 
since reason is associated with the civilised and logical, as opposed to the 
uncivilised and mystical (Masolo, 1994).  
 
The ongoing philosophical discussions on especially colonialism show 
how African philosophy is not solely an African affair. Africa has been 
related to the West for many centuries; especially in the course of slave 
trade and later on with colonialism. Therefore, the world outside the Afri-
can continent cannot be ignored when it comes to the discussion of Afri-
can philosophy. Indeed, many contemporary philosophers have occupied 
themselves with the colonial experience as the focal point of African phi-
losophy. 
 
3.1 The Colonisation of Africa 
The colonial period legally only lasted from 1884 when colonial occupa-
tion was politically legitimized, until most African countries gained po-
litical independence, chiefly in the 1960s (Eze, 1997).  
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However, when discussing the impact the West has had on Africa one has 
to go back to the 15th century, when the first Portuguese ventured into Af-
rica in search of gold and ivory and looked for a way to Asia without hav-
ing to cross the Muslim Middle East. Furthermore, they wanted to do 
missionary work and gain more knowledge about the African continent. 
The English and Dutch soon followed in the steps of the Portuguese and 
by the middle of the sixteenth century slaves from the African continent 
had become the main trade object. Through the trade of raw materials and 
slaves, Europe was able to increase its wealth; whereas Africa continu-
ously started falling behind and was unable to develop in the same pace. 
(Falola, 2002). 
 
Capitalism and industrialisation set the foundations for the colonisation of 
Africa, and the establishment of European bases in Africa secured easy 
and cheap access to essential- and raw materials. At the same time Africa 
provided a new market for the trade of European goods. At the Berlin 
Conference in 1884 it was established that every European nation had the 
right to own African land and the rules for the partition of the continent 
were launched. The colonisation of Africa came to mirror the intense 
competition between the European countries and the ongoing struggles 
for power. Through the colonies the European nations were able to ex-
hibit their political, economical and military strength (Falola, 2002).  
 
Western Philosophy and Anthropology on the subject of the Afri-
can 
European imperialism12 was not just a question of economics and poli-
tics, as philosophy played a crucial role in justifying the expansion of 
                                                 
12 a policy of extending a country's power and influence through colonization, use of 
military force, or other means Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University 
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European land and the trading of slaves. Philosopher E. Chukwudi Eze 
points out that significant aspects of the philosophies of Hume, Kant, 
Hegel and Marx have been shown to originate in, and to be intelligible 
only when understood as, an organic development within larger socio-
historical contexts of European colonialism and the ethnocentric idea 
(Eze, 1997: 214). Quoting Basil Davidson13 he argues that the idea of 
‘European Caucasian superiority’ and ‘Negroid inferiority’ developed 
parallel to the extension of colonial trade. In the early meetings between 
Europeans and Africans trade of raw material was carried out rather as an 
exchange between equals. As the demand shifted to human labour, there 
was a simultaneous change in the way Africans was looked upon, as no-
ticeable in literature where the African was portrayed as a savage (Eze, 
1997). 
 
 Philosophy in the period of the Enlightenment14 entailed change in the 
creation of a different discourse on the black African. Humanity was seen 
as Universal; however, as disseminated by Hume and Kant humanity was 
tied to the European and the white. Then since Africans obviously were 
not white, they were denied their humanity and slavery was thus not an 
issue necessary to discuss. Furthermore, Hegel’s15 idea of Africa’s posi-
                                                                                                                                            
Press.  Roskilde Universitetsbibliotek. 
28May2006  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&
entry=t23.e27753> 
 
13 Reference from Eze 
14  When speaking of the period of The Enlightenment, we are referring to philosophy 
in Europe in the 18th century. This movement advocated for rationality to rule ethics, 
aesthetics and all other forms of knowledge. The forerunners of this movement like 
David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-119804), saw it as their duty to 
lead the world out of superstition and irrationality towards progress (Jones: Retrieved 
May 25 2006). 
15 Hegel (1770-1831) was however not an enlightenment philosopher; his works 
rather came to be as a direct result of especially works by Kant (Jones: Retrieved May 
25 2006). 
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tion outside history would serve as justification for the colonisation of 
African land. Hegel saw Africa as the beginning of the movement of spirit 
(Eze, 1997: 215) - as something non-historical and therefore outside law 
and order. Enslavement and colonisation would be of benefit to Africans 
as they would learn about reason and ethics and receive culture and his-
tory from the Europeans.  
 
Anthropologist, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl16, is known for his descriptions of 
traditional African thought systems, which were as controversial as 
Hegel’s. He wrote about the differences between Western and non-
Western cultures by examining their thought structures and reasoning 
procedures. He believed the term 'pre-logical mentality' to be ‘the mind of 
the African’, and he did not think that this mentality had any significance 
beyond the discipline of anthropology (Masolo, 1994). Works by scholars 
like Hegel and Lévi-Bruhl among others contributed to the composition 
of the Western discourse on Africa, which was used as a framework for 
an ideology that sustained colonial rule. 
  
It has to be remembered that colonies were extensions of Europe and 
must reflect changes in Europe rather than the concerns of African sub-
jects (Falola, 2002:182). The European nations each had different ways of 
governing their colonies, still identical for all colonies were the immense 
changes, which came with colonisation. With an immense haste the 
Europeans brought modernity to the African continent; industrialisation, 
urbanisation and Western education - and with education came religion. 
The existing African social hierarchies were turned upside down. The 
traditional elite, the chiefs, diviners etc., had to surrender their power to a 
new elite, made up of the Africans who had received education. The po-
                                                 
16 1857-1939  
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larisation between the countryside and the civilised cities grew, as the cit-
ies were developing fast in comparison to the countryside (Falola 2002).  
 
Reactions to the hostile Western Discourse on the African 
The naturalist perception17 as put forward by Hume and Kant did not end 
with the abolishment of the slave trade. Nevertheless, Hegel’s evolution-
ary model would not hold stand, as it is exemplified by the Nigerian 
“Saros”18 which showed that even if an African would gain education and 
culture he would still remain sub-human. The suppression of the black 
people led to the foundation of movements trying to battle colonialism. 
These movements were to begin with set in motion by the new generation 
of educated black people. 
 
The cultural nationalism that arose in Africa at the end of the nineteenth 
century with the Saros as an elitist intellectual movement went against the 
very institutions that were the initial cause of their own attainment. Just 
as the ethno-philosophers19 and the Négritude thinkers20 some decades 
later they studied traditional African society, religion and art, and pro-
duced a number of books on the matter (Okonkwo, 1978).  
 
The end of colonialism was largely influenced by happenings placed out-
side Africa. In the 1920’s and the beginning of the 1930’s a cultural 
                                                 
17 The Naturalist perception being, that humanity was directly linked to having a 
white skin. 
18 Early nineteenth century: The Saros were originally Nigerians captured as slaves, 
who ended in Sierra Leone upon the rescue from slavery by the British Navy. Here, 
they received education, became Christians and endorsed English culture, Upon their 
return to Nigeria in the 1840’s, they took up important posts in Nigerian society. Frus-
trated by the growing racial segregation in Nigeria, they began to advocate for a re-
turn to African traditions and played a big role in the formation of cultural nationalism 
(Okonkwo:1978). 
19 See explanation of Ethno-philosophers p. 29, History chapter 
20 See explanation of Négritude on p. 28, History chapter 
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movement of ‘black consciousness’ flourished in the United States of 
America. This movement emerged simultaneous with the fight for politi-
cal, economic and social equality of black Africans living in America and 
became known as The Harlem Renaissance. The aim of this movement 
was to change the image of the black man, founded in the condescending 
Western discourse. Even though this movement was mainly concerned 
with securing civil rights for the black American, the literary activity that 
accompanied this movement had universal consequences (Masolo, 1994). 
 
Since the colonies were a reflection of the European conditions, Africa 
was naturally drawn into the Second World War. African soldiers were 
recruited and sent to the European battlefields to fight right next to the 
Europeans. The African experience of the Second World War turned out 
to play an important role in the movement for independence. 
First of all, the image of a civilised Europe was being shattered, taking 
into account the political, economical and moral chaos Europe was in. 
Africans fought next to Europeans as equal subjects in the fight for free-
dom yet they remained inferior. Second World War generated a deeper 
understanding of their situation and reduced the gap between them and 
the Europeans.  
 
Furthermore, the Second World War transformed the global power struc-
ture. The  power changed in favour of America and in the wake of the 
war the United Nations was founded on the 24th October 194521. Support-
ing the idea of independence for non-autonomous nations the creation of 
the Decolonisation Committee put further pressure on the colonising 
countries as they were asked to render reports on their motives (Falola 
2002).   
                                                 
21 retrieved at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory/; 25th May 2006 
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 The Second World War also led to an increase in exploitation of African 
land and especially African working power as the demand for raw mate-
rials increased further. With the industrial boom, trade unions started to 
emerge, which demanded better opportunities for the workers. Anti-
colonial literature was published, and many trade union leaders became 
political leaders (Falola, 2002).  
 
Independence and its Consequences 
The political debate in Africa in the 1960s was very influenced by the 
movement of black consciousness, which spread around the world and 
eventually led to the abolishment of colonialism and African independ-
ence. 
Ghana was the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence in 1957, 
followed by the majority of the other African countries throughout the 
1960s. However, the newly won independence would not automatically 
secure the improvements hoped for. With independence there was a wash 
of economical and political crisis. Africa became a continent drenched in 
war. By 1975, 21 countries were under military rule, and between 1960-
1992, 70 successful military coups had been recorded in 31 countries. 
The wars were often tied to political corruption and nationalism. Many of 
the new nations were originally mapped out by the European colonialists 
and not based on pre-existing groups e.g. ethnic groups. Ethnicity thus 
often became the starting point of military coups and civil wars (Falola, 
2002). 
 
Furthermore, Africa’s economic debt increased and in 1989 the World 
Bank stated that Africa was poorer than ever. Since the 1980’s Africa has 
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been facing a range of crisis due to war droughts, famines and health is-
sues, such as the HIV epidemic. 
The reasons for the entire crisis are innumerable and are placed within 
and outside the continent. A lot can be blamed on the political instability 
and mismanagement of many of the African countries. However, many of 
the causes may be rooted in the fact that African economy is largely de-
pendant on the European market, and that the economical global relations 
of the colonial time continue to exist. This has triggered a distinct dis-
course on the neo-colonisation of Africa (Falola, 2002). 
 
 
3.2 History of African thought 
As the most influential Africans were the ones who had received Western 
education, it is also in the educated environment we find many of the 
counter-reactions to colonialism. One of the anti-colonial trends was the 
formation of African philosophy.  
 
Though this is considered the beginning of African philosophical thought, 
recent historical research shows that there have been existing philoso-
phies, of an analytical nature, long before. The thesis of Ethiopian Zar’a 
Ya’ecob from 1667 and his disciple Walda Heywat in the 18th century 
show a conscious use of method and a subjective and critical approach to 
their subject of religiosity stressing the importance of reason (Sumner, 
1985). Furthermore, there is Anton Wilhelm Amo, born in Ghana in 
1703, who was brought to Germany where he pursued the study of phi-
losophy and later went on to teach as a professor at several universities 
(Wright, 1981).  
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Nevertheless it took 200 years before African philosophy and studies 
thereof set itself as a discipline. This was partly influenced by the libera-
tion movements, which took place in the mid 20th century, and were con-
cerned with fighting racial segregation.   
 
1930- 1950 
Négritude and its influences 
The French Négritude movement arose in the 1930’s and was a literary 
movement concerned with the re-establishment of the black identity. It 
was primarily fuelled by French speaking Africans living in Paris with 
forerunners such as Léopold Sédar Senghor22 and Aimé Césaire23, both  
of whom were poets. Through their poems they attributed immensely to 
Négritude and the reconstruction of the African identity.  
 
Cèsaire introduced the word Négritude in his poem Cahier d'un retour au 
pays natal (1939) 24 in which the word is used to grasp the dignity and 
humanity of black people. Jean-Paul Sartrè gave the Négritude movement 
its more philosophical perspective in his essay Orphée noir (1949)25 
where he described Négritude in existentialist terms as 'the-being-in-the-
world-of-the-Negro' (Irele 1998).  By referring to Marxism, Sartre gave 
Négritude a historical context as he interpreted the racial consciousness 
and message of collective freedom advocated by Négritude as […] a 
stage in a dialectic destined to be transcended by the advent of a classless 
and raceless world society (Irele, 199826). 
                                                 
22 1906-2001 Senghor was an important political theorist and the first president of 
Senegal from 1960 to 1980 
23 1913-1989 
24 English translation Notebook of a Return to my native land  
25 English translation Black Orpheus 
26 Retrieved May 21, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Z013SECT4 
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 By expanding on Sartre´s view, Senghor’s conception of Négritude was 
about encapsulating all the cultural values of the African people. Senghor 
describes the concept of ‘emotion’ as uniquely African. ‘Emotion’ is here 
not seen as psychological attribute, but rather as a complete manner of 
perceiving the world – a ‘worldview’. He sees emotion as being an inten-
tional state, and he therefore argues for it as a legitimate state of cognition 
(Irele, 1998). 
 
The collective ‘worldview’ and social organisation of the African that 
Senghor presented, fused both the natural as well as the supernatural into 
the African reality. This implies that all aspects of life now had a sacred 
character to it and Senghor also extended this idea to his political theory 
on African socialism. He wished to combine the traditional values of Af-
rica with the economic and social change brought about by modernity. 
Some say that Senghor’s political theories were somewhat more charac-
teristic of a concrete social-programme than of a philosophical postulate 
(Irele, 1998). 
 
Placide Tempel and Ethno-philosophy 
Not an African, but a white, Belgium, Franciscan missionary, Placide 
Tempel, was the first to write down this philosophy of the African people, 
ethno- philosophy27. In Bantu Philosophy (1949) 28 he describes a world-
view radically different from that of the West. Africans of Bantu origin 
were said to perceive and describe the world through expressions of “vital 
forces”, which is somewhat similar to Senghor’s ‘worldview’.  
 
                                                 
27 A concept first mentioned by Hountondji.  
28 This book was originally written in French and was translated into English in 1959.  
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African beliefs and values are described as being expressed in a ‘sym-
bolic’ and ‘ritualized’ nature, as apposed to a more verbal one. The only 
verbalised expressions are thought to be found in myths and proverbs. 
The notions argued were especially attached to the expressions of the 
Bantu language; a language which was said to be closely related to a spe-
cific African worldview (Hallen 2002). 
 
Tempel´s Bantu philosophy seems to endorse this collective African iden-
tity advocated in Négritude. Tempel is, however, strongly criticised by 
African intellectuals for generally being Eurocentric and belittling to the 
African mind (Hallen 2002). He says for example that Africans are inca-
pable of articulating the very perceptions through which they experience 
and understand the world and that somebody else needs to write down 
their philosophy for them (Hallen 2002). 
 
Tempel’s work has been criticised by intellectuals as they point out that 
his work was not merely meant to prove that Africans were rational and 
in possession of logical belief systems, but also intended as a handbook 
for the colonial institutions in Africa in order to further conquer Africa 
spiritually and integrate Christianity (Hountondji, 1976). 
 
 
1950-1970 
Thoughts on African identity  
As a direct consequence of Négritude and the abolition of colonialism, 
the 1950s and 1960s brought attention to thoughts of African identity. 
This can for example be seen in the works of Senegalese Cheikh Anta 
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Diop29, who examines the African identity from a more historical per-
spective. In his works30 he tries to show how ancient Egypt was in actual 
fact an integrated part of the black African civilization. However the sig-
nificance of Diop is rather seen in the validity he presents in his argu-
ments and conclusions. Diop saw Africa as a single unified cultural area. 
He bases this on similar cultural forms and value systems that he argues 
exists between ancient Egypt and Africa’s indigenous civilisations (Irele, 
1998).  
 
The philosophical implication of this is that Diop describes an Africa 
with a comprehensive history where it is seen as being informed or 
knowledgeable, which clashes with the Hegel’s philosophy on the Afri-
can as not being historical. The erudition and methodological effort he 
[Diop] invested in constructing an 'historical sociology' aimed to restore 
Africa to an honourable place in universal history (Irele, 1998).  Irele 
continues to quote Diop: Historical science cannot shed all the light one 
might expect it to cast upon the past until it integrates the African com-
ponent of humanity, in proportion to the role it has actually played in his-
tory, into its synthesis (Irele, 1998). 
 
Despite the critique, many African philosophers have built Tempel’s gen-
eral ideas into a school of thought within African Philosophy, which 
dominated the field until the end of the 1960’s. This school of thought is 
primarily defined by the translation of African experiences directly into 
the pre-existing categories, concepts and languages of European philoso-
phy as well as other disciplines, meaning they were translated and con-
                                                 
29 1923-1986 Senegalese historian and anthropologist. 
30 Here is mostly referred to the following works of Diop: Nations nègres et culture 
(Black Nations and Culture) (1956) and L'Unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire (Cultural 
Unity of Black Africa) (1959) 
 33
verted into a Western paradigm. It is on the basis of this definition that 
this school eventually became known as ethno-philosophy (Masolo, 
1994).  
 
As we will see in the analysis, some of the influential writers in the 
1960’s were the reverent John S. Mbiti from Kenya who wrote African 
Religions and Philosophy (1969), and the Ghanaian philosopher W.E. 
Abraham, who wrote The Mind of Africa in (1962) in which he pro-
claimed his dissatisfaction with the image of Africa created in Western 
discourse.  
 
One reason why Abraham became so influential was that he was schooled 
in the traditional Western academic philosophy. This was in his favour 
when he advocated for various philosophical aspects, which he analysed 
in Africa’s indigenous cultures. He believed that all Africans share cer-
tain fundamental beliefs and values, and he then analysed his own Akan 
culture to show how these beliefs operate within a philosophical context 
(Hallen, 2002). 
 
Mbiti, coming from a theological background, sees religion as a phe-
nomenon integrated in all aspects of society (Masolo, 1994). Furthermore 
Mbiti’s discussion on the concept of time attracted a lot of attention, as he 
claimed that Africans have no conception of the “distant” future. This de-
bate on the notion of time led to a great interest and various debates on 
the issue of time in the context of Africa. A consequence of this debate is 
a discussion of whether African languages can be used for philosophiz-
ing. It also required African philosophers to settle on whether it should be 
taken for granted that Africa has certain common values and beliefs. It 
had to take into consideration the disciplines of social anthropology and 
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religious studies, as the claims of these two fields in many ways contra-
dict or weaken the very existence of African philosophy.  
It has been stated that at this time the crucial thing for academic African 
philosophy was to establish itself as a discipline, (Hallen, 2002). 
 
 
1970 and onwards  
A change in the nature of African Philosophy 
As a counter-reaction to how African philosophy had formed itself in the 
1960s, the notion of African thought began to change. The controversial 
theoretical comparison and critique of both African and Western thought 
presented by Robin Horton31 in his essay African Traditional Thought 
and Western Science (1967) led to many African philosophers pursuing 
African philosophy as an independent discipline.  
Horton disregarded the notion of African thought as being essentially 
symbolic and ritualistic (Hallen, 2002).  
In the second part of Horton’s essay he identifies certain logically flawed 
types of reasoning, which he sees as characteristic of African thought. 
Thereby he discredits the reliability of these systems as being of intellec-
tual value. As a response, many African scholars criticized Horton’s 
methodology as being flawed and his empirical findings as being false 
(Hallen, 2002).  
 
This essay by Horton was one of the factors leading to a new trend within 
philosophy, concerning itself with the definition and nature of rationality 
(Masolo, 1994). The reason for the change in the debate was because 
                                                 
31 Horton was formally trained in philosophy, science and social anthropology, (Hal-
len, 2002).  
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many African philosophers held that disciplines such as anthropology and 
religious studies were not in a position to define the nature of “rational-
ity” in the African context.  
  
One of the more prominent philosophers, who share the conviction of ra-
tionality being universal, was the Nigerian Peter Bodunrin. His contribu-
tion to the debate lies in his attempt to define the discipline of ‘philoso-
phy’. In the spirit of true Universalism, he was opposed to the idea that 
the values and beliefs of the African people can be used as a foundation 
of African philosophy. Bodunrin insisted that anything that is to be wor-
thy of the name philosophy should have a critical and reflective nature 
(Hallen, 2002).  
 
Paulin J. Hountondji is also one of the philosophers especially influential 
in Africa in the 1980’s (Masolo, 1994). He asserted himself significantly; 
especially in regards to the idea of the much disputed ‘ethno-philosophy’. 
Hountondji applies the characteristics of scientific knowledge to his defi-
nition of philosophy. He adamantly defines philosophy in two ways. First 
of all philosophy is seen as a scientific discourse in method, with univer-
sal aspirations. Secondly philosophy, in a historical context, is seen as 
meta-philosophy, meaning philosophy reflecting on philosophical dis-
course (Masolo, 1994).  
 
The debate was additionally influenced by Henry Odera Oruka’s distinc-
tion of African philosophy in four trends.  
The first field he called Ethno-philosophy, a term invented by Houn-
tondji. It is mostly concerned with communal philosophy based on myths 
and proverbs and also regarded as a ‘worldview’ (Oruka, 1990).   
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Nationalist-ideological philosophy focuses on the discourses that arose in 
colonial and postcolonial Africa and is of an ideological and political na-
ture (Oruka, 1990). 
Professional philosophy concerns professionally trained philosophers 
who present their views on African philosophy, on the foundation of the 
strict analytical approach, defined by the West (Oruka, 1990). Oruka 
places himself, Bodunrin and Hountondji as some of the representatives 
within this trend (Bodunrin, 1981).  
The last field defined by Oruka is Sage philosophy which he is also 
thought to be the founder of, The general claim of this trend is that in tra-
ditional and contemporary Africa there exists certain wise men and 
women, who without formal training are able to communicate their 
thoughts in the critical manner, which is thought of as characteristically 
philosophical (Oruka, 1990)   
 
On the Universal and the Relative 
The debate organised itself into two camps; those who believe that ra-
tionality is universal, such as Bodunrin and Hountondji, and those who 
believe that rationality is culturally relative, for instance Mbiti. 
Those who advocate the idea of rationality as being universal have had a 
huge impact on the academic field of African philosophy especially in the 
1980s. They argued that “rationality” is a central concept in the discipline 
of philosophy, and if anybody was to define what is “rational” in a culture 
it should be philosophers (Hallen, 2002). Even though the different phi-
losophers all allow for the diversity of cultural traditions, they are persis-
tent that the patterns of reasoning and cognitive systems (Hallen, 2002: 
34) in these cultures should essentially be the same on a global scale. 
 37
Those who are of the conviction that ‘rationality’ is universal believe that 
the world we live in is rational in the sense that it is ruled by cause and 
effect, and that man is seen as a ‘rational creator’ within this world. They 
also defend this position by saying that it is reason, which enables us to 
[…] master nature, manipulate society, change culture, and, indeed, 
shape our lives (Masolo, 1994: 126).  Reality for them is dependant on 
consistency of reality and that ‘truth’ is dependant on science. Therefore 
there can only be one universal rationality defined by the rules of logic 
and inference. These rules enable one to make trans-cultural and com-
parative judgements as to the degree of rationality or irrationality in a sys-
tem of thought or a belief (Masolo, 1994).  
 
This scientific and rather Western definition of philosophy and rationality 
has been challenged by those in favour of cultural relativism. Cultural 
relativism has its roots in relativist philosophy, but is primarily an anthro-
pological approach that was developed in the first half of the 20th century 
and made a premise for anthropological research. Franz Boas was espe-
cially influential in the establishment of the relativist thought as he sought 
to battle the common evolutionist32 and often racist outlook of former an-
thropologists (Eriksen, 2001).  
Cultural relativists question why the Western model of rationality is a 
measurement of rationality, as they see it as being too conventional. What 
is needed, they argue, is to apply some self-critique to these unconscious 
assumptions of Western rationality (Masolo, 1994: 128). Another oppos-
ing view to the universalist conception of rationality, is that if one 
stresses the importance of the features shared by the cognitive systems, 
                                                 
32 Evolutionists proclaimed a ranking of cultures according to how civilised they 
were. The last an highest  ranked element in the evolutionary model is Western civili-
sation, to which the less developed cultures are inferior (Eriksen:2001).  
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one might overlook other, equally important, ways to the “truth” or un-
derstanding (Hallen, 2002).  
 
We thus have the universalist position on the one side holding that sci-
ence is defined by prescribed rational actions; and on the other side cul-
tural relativists who are in favour of a variety of human experiences and 
multiple systems of representation (Masolo, 1994). 
None of these positions are necessarily superior to the other; they each 
just have different characteristics. Or perhaps it is just a question of em-
phasis; where the one focuses on commonalities and the other focuses on 
differences. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - ANALYSIS 
 
 
In the following chapter we will present the different themes that we have 
found in respectively W.E. Abraham´s In the mind of Africa (1962) and 
John S. Mbiti´s African religions and Philosophy (1969), and P.O. 
Bodunrin’s article the Question of African Philosophy (1981) and Paulin 
J. Hountondji’s article What Philosophy Can Do? (1987) 
This is done to shed light on some of the focal points of the debate of Af-
rican philosophy in the 1960s and 1980s. We have used a hermeneutic 
approach to the texts, and are thereby mainly describing themes that will 
be used in the forthcoming discussion. 
  
1960s 
Essentialism 
In The mind of Africa, Abraham extensively describes culture as being 
linked with either a scientific view of human nature or with an essentialist 
view. However he makes an essentialist interpretation of culture in the 
sense that he believes all cultures on the continent of Africa to share cer-
tain fundamental beliefs and values. The central feature of the type to 
which African cultures belong, is that there is a certain world-view to 
which can be related all other central concepts, including those of relig-
ion and theology, morality and social organisation (Abraham 1962:45). 
Even though Abraham works according to such a paradigm, he points out 
that he is aware of the fact that African cultures do differ in many aspects. 
However he still argues for the existence of such a framework. 
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In order to illustrate how these beliefs and values function within a par-
ticular cultural context, he uses the Akan culture of which he origins, as 
an example of how this paradigm functions within such a context. 
 
Even though Abraham speaks of a unity among African cultures, he does 
not imply that this unity is in any sense unique to Africa.  He does not 
rule out the possibility that in some other place, at some other time, per-
haps people have arranged their fundamental beliefs in somewhat the 
same fashion as present-day “black” Africa. Abraham believes that a cul-
ture must have an essence in order to exist.  
 
Mbiti, like Abraham, also has an essentialist view on African cultures. 
Even though he distinguishes between different peoples in his book, Afri-
can Religions and Philosophy, he still argues for the idea of the existence 
of common beliefs within the different cultures; thus he argues for a uni-
fied African philosophy. He does so by showing examples of peoples that 
are geographically unconnected, but nevertheless seem to think alike, 
thereby proving the existence of a unified African system of thought. It is 
important here to mention that he uses his own empirical studies of dif-
ferent African peoples as the bases of his theories.  
 
His fundamental postulate is that religion is all consuming for the African 
peoples, and that it is inseparable from all other spheres of life, including 
philosophy. Therefore religion is their philosophy, and their entire 
thought system is built on religion. African Religions and Philosophy be-
gins with the following quote: Africans are notoriously religious, and 
each people has its own religions systems with a set of beliefs and prac-
tices. Religion permeates into all the departments of life so fully that it is 
not easy or possible to isolate it (Mbiti, 1969:1). 
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Communitarianism vs. Individual Philosophising 
Abraham distinguishes between public philosophy and private philoso-
phy. Public philosophy he sees as the tracing out of the theoretical foun-
dations of the traditional society or a lying bare of the communal mind 
(Abraham 1962: 104). Private philosophy on the other hand is the ideas 
of an individual. With this in mind, that Africa is a communitarian society 
primarily engaged with ‘public philosophy’, Abraham questions the ne-
cessity of individual African philosophers to philosophise. 
 
On the subject of communitarianism, Mbiti holds strong opinions. He 
does not believe that the African people is able to exist outside a group. 
Whatever happens to the whole group also happens to the individual. I 
am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am (Mbiti, 1969:141).  
According to Mbiti, people who have lived in the same village or com-
munity hold stronger bonds when they move to another city, than they 
hold with other people living in that same city (Mbiti, 1969). So the city 
represents the opposite of traditional values, namely modernity and indi-
vidualism. So, as a result of moving to a bigger city, a person will begin 
to feel lonely and isolated because of the forced individualisation. This 
person has always been a part of a community and having to decide 
things for himself supersedes that person’s usual lifestyle.    
 
Thus we can conclude that Abraham and Mbiti both advocate that the tra-
ditional African is part of a communitarian society, where everyone live 
‘integrated lives’, meaning that they are integrated in their society.  
 
Oral literature 
Abraham discusses various definitions of literature at length. He attempts 
to define what literature is and what it can be used for and is thereby ac-
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counting for these prescriptions as being present in the Akan culture. 
Abraham thinks that literature can fundamentally be described as being a 
body of experience by sensitive men and women, given flesh through the 
imaginative use of language, and able to kindle an appraising response of 
thought and emotion in its public (Abraham 1962: 103).   
 
Abraham argues that the absence of writing among the Akan does not 
mean that they are not capable of philosophical ideas. As an argument for 
the validity of proverbs and myth as means of philosophising, Abraham 
states that most philosophical theories, even in Western philosophy, can 
be stated in a few sentences. The body of literature that normally follows 
mainly comprises of explanations and arguments for the theories them-
selves.  
 
Because the Akans did not have a tradition of writing they expressed their 
philosophical and religious ideas through art among other ways. Abraham 
says that in art there was a moral-philosophical preoccupation which 
lead it to portray forces of the world, and to portray a force it was essen-
tial that it should not be treated as something assimilated, and conse-
quently like something overcome, as the rendering of it in life-like figures 
would have been (Abraham, 1962:111). He feels that this unique expres-
sion has been vandalised or disgraced by the Europeans, and that its pa-
tronage has been lost in favour of scientific method. 
 
In order to understand the way that Africans think, Mbiti has looked at 
many different languages from all over Africa. The different words, or 
lack thereof, say a lot about society, he believes. He also looks into dif-
ferent religious and social rituals, as a way of investigating their thought 
systems. In accordance to the religious aspects, he also looks into prov-
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erbs. These are very relevant for Mbitis studies, and he believes that 
Proverbs are common ways of expressing religious ideas and feelings[…] 
it is in proverbs that we find the remains of the oldest form of African re-
ligious and philosophical wisdom. (Mbiti, 1969:66-67) 
We can therefore say that Mbiti, like Abraham, does not regard written 
material as a necessity. 
 
On the Nature of African Philosophy 
In The mind of Africa Abraham discusses a wide variety of subjects. In 
his description of the Akan world view he looks into issues such as the 
supernatural, various social institutions, government, legal system, litera-
ture, metaphysics, ethics etc. After he describes the paradigm in which 
the Akan function, he continues to take a historical look at Africa and 
what the loss and gain of independence have meant for them. Further-
more he philosophises on possible solutions for the problems Africa faces 
today. Abraham does this mainly in relation to the field of politics, eco-
nomics and various social institutions. His solution relies heavily on the 
unity of Africa for the solution of most problems. 
 
Abraham briefly discusses what he believes the nature of African phi-
losophy is and should be. He points out that the existence of an African 
philosophy should not rely on the fact that it is unique, and he sees no 
reason why African philosophy should be different from all other phi-
losophy. Actually Abraham believes it to be sufficient that philosophy 
merely derives from inside Africa and not outside. Abraham believes that 
questions or problems raised in philosophy in other areas of the world 
may have an answer in African philosophy, because, even though, the 
methods of philosophising might be different, people from different con-
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tinents would still philosophise on the same issues to some extent, i.e. 
marriage, death etc.  
He emphasises the importance of traditional thought. He believes that it is 
in examining the traditional thought that one is able to come to certain 
main trends that could help define the ideology of a society. It is by pre-
senting such a framework one is able to conduct further analysis of soci-
ety.  
 
Though the title of Mbiti ´s book is African Religions and Philosophy, it 
is primarily concerned with religions. As mentioned earlier, this is be-
cause he believes African philosophy to be African religions. Religion 
carries the moral codes of a society, and it [religion] should and can pro-
vide tools and inspiration to the man of Africa to think afresh the funda-
mental issues of his life which matter most, and to find both meaning and 
security in that life (Mbiti 1969:267).  
 
According to Mbiti, the fact that a person thinks and acts is a mere proof 
that the person is philosophizing; and because a certain person originates 
from Africa, his philosophizing becomes African philosophy. Mbiti ar-
gues for one more way of defining African philosophy. ‘African philoso-
phy’ [here] refers to the understanding, attitude of mind, logic and per-
ception behind the manner in which African people think, act or speak in 
different situations in life (Mbiti 1969:2).  
 
Mbiti criticises the lack of studies done on African culture, and sees this 
as one of the problems with defining African thoughts. Taking his point 
of departure in the many different religions, Mbiti finds that even though 
religions in Africa are different, there are also many parallels between 
them. One finds many cultural similarities which cut across ethnic and 
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linguistic differences while at the same time some peoples who for gen-
erations have existed side by side, exhibit cultural traits that are re-
markably different from those of their neighbours (Mbiti 1969:100-101).  
 
Philosophy is an entire way of life, and therefore Mbiti sees the religions 
of Africa as philosophy. To discard the traditional beliefs would not be 
right, and the fact that religion is the same as philosophy can be justified 
through the empirical studies done by Mbiti among others. According to 
Mbiti the studies clearly show that the African peoples have ethics, mor-
als and thought systems, and additionally he resolves that Africa must 
have a philosophy, because every culture has a philosophy.  
 
Morality and Rationality 
Abraham explains that it would not make sense to examine the Akan cul-
ture as a paradigm of individual thought by only looking at the private 
philosophy. The Akan did indeed reflect upon the state of the world; but 
not as Abraham explains, the world ‘inside’33, but rather the world of 
which they are a part. For the Akan the world has no externality, the 
world is seen as metaphysical and not scientific. 
 
Abraham explains that the European worldview is based on the idea of 
cause and effect, and modernity has caused a decrease in the thought that 
the conception of the relation between ideas determines the content and 
nature of the world (Abraham 1962:46). In Europe, the world exists only 
on an intellectual level and it is here research is conducted, and according 
to this view the world was created according to a rationalist philosophy. 
In the Akan view, however, the world is metaphysical and the world is 
                                                 
33 Here seeing the individual as a separate unit as Europe and the modern world do.  
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therefore not a rationalist philosopher. There is a clear relation between 
ideas and between what happens in nature. True metaphysics must be re-
lated to a deductive system and all areas of life stem from this system - 
morality, politics, medicine, theory of social organisation etc.   
 
Therefore one can say that because morality was founded on metaphysi-
cal beliefs, the ethics of the Akan was rationalistic. Abraham nevertheless 
points out that just because the world is conceived as metaphysical to the 
Akan, not all its problems are solved by metaphysical means; the Akan 
did indeed have science and technology as he then describes. 
 
 
1980s 
African Philosophy 
Both Bodunrin and Hountondji discuss: What is African Philosophy? 
What is the ontological state of African philosophy and what is its nature?  
According to Bodunrin, critique is equal to philosophy; and he argues that 
rationality, logic and coherence are important dimensions of philosophy, 
but are not sufficient when having to define the discipline of philosophy. 
African systems of belief can be both rational, logic and coherent, but still 
not philosophical because they are not critical. In Hountondji’s view cri-
tique is also an important aspect of philosophy, which is dynamic and 
never stable. Thus philosophy can never provide absolute truths and 
never serve as a system of beliefs.  
 
Hountondji proposes that African philosophy is the African philosophical 
literature […] (Hountondji 1987:5), which means that all philosophical 
texts produced by Africans are thus African philosophy, and he under-
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lines that this characterisation of African philosophy is still in a working 
process. He calls this characterisation of African philosophy polemical, 
meaning that there is no philosophy except in and by means of discourse 
(Hountondji 1987:5), as it dismisses the idea of a silent or hidden phi-
losophy. So Hountondji underlines that the existence of African philoso-
phical texts must not be overlooked.  
Hountondji (1987) admits that he has been criticised of the above-
mentioned definition, as some find African philosophical literature to be a 
geographical criterion. The African origin of authors, […] presented as 
necessary and sufficient condition for a philosophy to be called “Afri-
can” would be a way of “avoiding the debate on the content of African 
philosophy”, and a true “imposture” (Hountondji 1987:6).  
 
Hountondji views philosophy as meta-philosophy, which basically means 
that philosophy means philosophizing on philosophy. Philosophy is his-
tory as it takes place - a never-ending process, which furthermore under-
lines why philosophy cannot offer a fixed set of truths. The latter also re-
sides in the fact that philosophy is a subjective discipline, that philoso-
phers enter a collective discussion or collective search as individuals. 
 
The Trends of Philosophy 
Bodunrin acknowledges the definitions of the trends defined by Oruka, 
but dismisses three34 of them as philosophical, because they only seek to 
portray traditional systems of belief and justify their rationality, instead of 
approaching any material critically. 
 
                                                 
34 Philosophic Sagacity, Nationalist-Ideological philosophy and Ethno-philosophy; 
(see chapter 2, p. ?) 
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Concerning political ideologies Bodunrin explains how political philoso-
phers advocated a return to African traditional values and institutions. 
Bodunrin sees this as a good idea in theory, yet in practice it is impossi-
ble, as Africa has been transformed in innumerable ways by among others 
colonialism, Christianity and Islam.  
So, there is a clash between tradition and modernity and Bodunrin advo-
cates that Africans look to the future for a solution rather than clinging to 
the past: African humanism must not be backward-looking humanism. 
There is no country whose traditional ideology could cope with the de-
mands of the modern world, (Bodunrin, 1981:7).  
 
With Sage philosophy in mind Bodunrin argues that writing is not a nec-
essary precondition for philosophy, yet its importance should not be un-
derestimated either: Even if writing cannot be a precondition for philoso-
phy, nevertheless, the role of writing in the creation of a philosophical 
tradition cannot be underrated, (Bodunrin 1981:10). Philosophy should 
not and cannot be a fixed system, but should rather be an autonomous 
discipline, as for example mathematics.   
 
According to Bodunrin ethno-philosophers and political thinkers tend to 
be enticed by their own material and thus become guilty of romanticising 
the African past, believing wrongly that communalism existed as human-
ity and thereby miscalculate the state of African societies today. Addi-
tionally, Bodunrin thinks of ethno-philosophy as the one in most contrast 
to the position he wishes to urge, and so does Hountondji; because they 
both belong to the trend of professional philosophy, and for such reasons 
do not accept ethno-philosophy as proper philosophy.  
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Hountondji distinguishes between two currents in the contemporary Afri-
can philosophical debate: ethno-philosophy, as opposed to professional 
philosophy.  
Hountondji emphasises that the ethno-philosophical project must be radi-
cally re-interpreted. Ethno-philosophy has worked as a European theo-
retical project inseparable from the transformations of the European self- 
conscience (Hountondji, 1987:4). Therefore it is dangerous for Africa as a 
Third World country to be a part of that discourse as this project is just 
one among others: It is the ethno-philosophical project itself that the 
Third World philosophers must reexamine critically, before allowing 
themselves to be imprisoned into it and subordinate their theoretical ini-
tiatives to it (Hountondji 1987:6). The Africans could not take part in this 
project of establishing African philosophy on an equal level with the 
ethno-philosophers. Therefore Hountondji believes that the project has no 
relevance for the African today (the 1980’s).         
As an illustration he explains how ethno-philosophers have accepted a 
pre-Kantian tradition of seeing the “object of philosophy”, as God, im-
mortality, the origin of the world, etc[…] (Hountondji 1987:9), and have 
consequently dismissed all critical reflection. Hountondji further says that 
this form of philosophy has not solved any of the problems, which it has 
been met by.  
 
In defence of the early philosophical literature produced in for example 
the 1960’s, Hountondji points out that it was maybe necessary for this lit-
erature to develop un-criticised, as it was part of the evolutionary process 
to establish an independent African philosophy. However he now insists 
on a re-evaluation of this material and says that if Africa wants to be able 
to constructively contribute to philosophy as a discipline, it needs to put 
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more focus on the methods and sources used by philosophical traditions 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
 
Challenges to African Philosophy & the Task of African Philosophy 
Bodunrin sees the emergence of the debate of African philosophy as the 
result of several challenges caused by the clash between African and 
Western culture. The need for a philosophy, which stands as African, is 
according to Bodunrin only necessary because he believes that a people 
without their own philosophy is regarded as being intellectually inferior. 
He does not see why Africa should have a special way of philosophising, 
when they do not have special ways of doing any of the other academic 
fields. He thereby tries to detach philosophy from its geographical 
boundaries. 
 
Another challenge was the movements for independence. Firstly, Afri-
cans had to gain both political and mental independence from the coloni-
alists, according to Bodunrin. Secondly, philosophy had become a value-
laden expression (Bodunrin 1981:5), meaning that it was looked upon as 
a cultural dimension, which every culture with intellectual means ought 
to have.  
 
Hountondji explains that many look to philosophy as a solution to their 
problems, whether they are religious questions, political problems and/or 
of a social nature etc.; and he further underlines that it would be illusory 
to expect philosophy to solve them (Hountondji 1987:8). He refers to a 
problem-solving philosophy as “involved philosophy” and “a philosophy 
of action” (Hountondji 1987:10). With Africa in mind Hountondji even 
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calls the so-called ‘active philosophy’ unnecessary and damaging, mean-
ing that using philosophy to solve political problems, for instance, would 
damage more than it would help.  
 
Hountondji believes the task of philosophy on certain areas, for instance 
national liberation or in the role of literature, is yet unclear. Still, he turns 
to discuss a possible reconciliation of materialism and religious belief, or 
ideology and philosophy, in terms of  “consciencism” formulated by 
Kwame Nkrumah35, as opposed to the Kantian view that materialism and 
philosophy cannot be joined together. Also Hountondji reaches the con-
clusion that political problems need political and not philosophical justi-
fications. Therefore the role of political practice is irreplaceable (with for 
instance philosophy).  
 
So, in Hountondji’s view philosophy as a term has become overloaded. 
Too much is expected from philosophy to solve economical, political and 
social problems. In conclusion philosophy cannot solve problems of tradi-
tional and ‘speculative meta-physical’ sort, nor substitute any practices, 
e.g. political or social etc.  
 
The Responsibility of the African Philosopher 
Bodunrin expects of the African philosopher to assert her case as clear as 
possible so as not to mislead the reader, and not least to argue critically 
for her case, for instance in including strengths and or weaknesses of rival 
                                                 
35 Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972), Ghanian political thinker and anti-colonialist; 
prime-minister (1957-1960) when Ghana achieved independence, and president 
(1960-66); he proclaimed himself president for life in 1964, and was overthrown in a 
military coup, due to his dictatorial methods. Retrieved at: Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University press. Roskilde Universitetsbibliotek. 28 May 2006 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=t150.e
47118>  
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theories; or to present how the theory may solve the problem at hand. She 
may also elaborate on the reader’s understanding on a subject she is al-
ready aware of.  
Bodunrin also expects that the philosopher engage in an active discussion 
when and if she has presented any new theories; and that she justifies any 
criticism on that new theory. Moreover, the African philosopher must be 
willing to accept criticism and is prepared even to change her view. As 
seen above Bodunrin does not believe that every African philosopher 
lives up to these expectations, yet especially not the ethno-philosophers.  
Therefore the philosopher’s approach to her study must be one of criti-
cism, by which one does not mean ‘negative appraisal’, but rational im-
partial and articulate appraisal whether positive or negative (Bodunrin 
1981:13).  
 
Hountondji lists several points, to which he thinks the African philoso-
pher owes responsibility. First of all she must be critical and ideologically 
clarify illusions that suppress and confuses the individual African and the 
‘masses’, that have no presuppositions of knowledge. Furthermore Afri-
can philosophers should concentrate more on the debates taking place in 
Africa, in stead of simply looking towards the West and they should real-
ise that the studies Europeans have produced about ‘African-ness’ is sim-
ply not relevant for them.  
In relation to this Hountondji believes that only through Marxism can the 
African philosopher understand how African societies are abused and the 
problems that stem from this abuse. Therefore, the African philosopher 
must continuously develop and criticise philosophy in order to solve 
problems that are masked by pseudo-problems cloaked in mystification 
(Hountondji 1987:22). Within her domain of expertise, e.g. linguistics, 
history etc., the African philosopher should also acquire information nec-
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essary to reformulate solution(s) to existing problems that may be subject 
to a dysfunctional dominant rhetoric (Hountondji 1987).  
 
At last, the African philosopher as an individual still belongs to a certain 
class in society, and she or he is therefore forced to take part whether he 
likes it or not, in the field of political struggles (Hountondji 1987:24). 
Then he must be conscious of his membership to a class and to the politi-
cal choices to which that class predisposes him (Hountondji 1987:24). 
Thus she can arrange them in accordance with her own will, in order to 
put herself on the path of collective liberation and of the emancipation of 
the working classes (Hountondji 1987:24).  
 
Communalism vs. Universalism 
Bodunrin also investigates the aspect of communalism, which by many 
philosophers has been put forward as a defining trait of ‘African-ness’. 
He notes that traditional African communalism was based on the small 
village society and ancestry, and not on humanity. Furthermore Bodunrin 
claims that the lack of communalism amongst African peoples was one of 
the reasons why colonisation was possible.  
Because Africa is still traditional in many ways and philosophical issues 
come from real life situations, African philosophy should not write off 
traditional systems, myths and proverbs, but only approach its sources 
critically and view them in context of present-day Africa (Bodunrin 
1981). Furthermore, Bodunrin believes that African philosophy should 
look beyond Africa and relate philosophical debates to what is going on 
elsewhere in the world. 
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According to Bodunrin the universality of philosophy resides in the fact 
that if a problem is philosophical it must have a universal relevance to all 
men, (Bodunrin 1981:13). He further discusses the condition for philoso-
phy in individual thoughts and collective thought systems. For instance 
Bodunrin (1981) argues that objections against the collective thought sys-
tems of a whole people is not enough to dismiss an attempt to name col-
lective thought systems as philosophical. Since we hold that philosophy is 
properly studied, according to us, through the examination of the 
thoughts of individuals, another argument we have used against ethno-
philosophers is that the collective thought of peoples upon which they 
concentrate is not genuine philosophy. […] it is not clear why the thought 
of groups, if there is a such thing, cannot be a proper subject for philoso-
phical study, (Bodunrin 1981:11). Finally Bodunrin warns that to argue 
against the notion of a group thought, would be to assume that philosophy 
has been settled in advance, (Bodunrin 1981:11).  
 
Hountondji regards the ethno-philosophical idea of collective systems of 
belief only as an anthropological concept of philosophy; and he points out 
the  “Bantu Philosophy” and the “Dogon Philosophy” among others as 
examples of the ethno-philosophers’ insufficient literature, because it 
lacks critique (See p. 29ff on Ethno-philosophy). Furthermore The exis-
tence of an African philosophy is in fact demonstrated there only at the 
expense of an extraordinary dilation of the concept of ‘philosophy’, ad-
mitted practically as a synonym of ‘culture’ (Hountondji 1987:4).  
 
Hountondji thinks that the way Africa is described as having its own cul-
ture and ideology results in an imprisonment and determination, and he 
therefore finds the whole discourse about Africa limiting. It must be re-
membered that Africa is a continent, not a shared set of values. Academ-
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ics and others have sought after the ‘true African’, but this does not exist 
(Hountondji 1987); an African is simply one who is attached to the geo-
graphical concept Africa. This confusion calls for a demystification of Af-
rica and the need for reducing ‘African-ness’ to a fact and thereby free it 
from all mystic connotations. It comes back to the European project in 
which focus was not on “philosophy”, but on “African”.  
So, Hountondji believes that African philosophy is just another label next 
to African religion, African democracy etc., which have been created be-
cause of the West.  
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Chapter Five - Discussion 
 
In this chapter we want to address the questions, formulated in the prob-
lem definition, as well as examine some additional problems that have 
come to our attention during the process of writing. 
The discussion has been divided our discussion into five sections, which 
all relate to our problem definition. In these sections the meaning we have 
extracted from the texts in themes, will be accounted for and will be con-
textualised into a socio-historical realm. This is done in order to gain both 
a better understanding of the texts and to better comprehend the ontologi-
cal nature of African Philosophy. 
 
5.1 What is African? 
To both Abraham and Mbiti, Africa is a unified concept because there ex-
ists what they believe to be, a shared African culture. The different tradi-
tional cultures all share certain common values and beliefs that are 
grounded in their notion of communitarianism. This entails that the indi-
vidual is defined through its community. Neither the community nor the 
individual can therefore exist independently of each other. For that rea-
son, it does not make sense to speak of an individual philosophising- only 
on behalf of herself, as philosophy is rather expressed through various in-
stitutions in society. Thus grounding the idea of Africa in a shared system 
of values. 
 
Mbiti’s conviction is that religion is omnipresent. To him, religion equals 
culture, which thus equals philosophy, thereby, to Mbiti religion, and phi-
losophy is one and the same thing. Through his empirical studies, he has 
found that the different African religions have similar functions in society 
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and that religion determines the communal thought system. It is through 
daily rituals that religion and hence philosophy is expressed. Abraham 
however, does not so explicitly believe that it is religion that constitutes 
the essential unifying aspect of the African society. What unifies Africa is 
rather a certain worldview that he sees functioning as philosophy.  
 
In the selected texts from the 1980s a change is seen in the way of per-
ceiving Africa, opposing the view articulated by Mbiti and Abraham. 
Bodunrin and Hountondji approach the subject of ‘African-ness’ criti-
cally, as they disregard the idea of a unified African thought system  
 
According to Hountondji, being ‘African’ is solely a geographical label, 
referring to an individual’s place of origin, instead of a unifying system 
of thought, as presented by Mbiti and Abraham. Hountondji stresses the 
importance of liberating Africa from the belief that there are certain fun-
damental similarities within the African peoples that unite them as a peo-
ple. The search for the true African is an impossible task, according to 
Bodunrin who reflects on this matter, stating that the search for an Afri-
can mindset has led to a romanticising of the past. 
 
This mindset advocated by both Négritude thinkers as well as ethno-
philosophers Mbiti and Abraham, is founded in the traditional setting, and 
therefore it cannot be transferred to modern societies, because they are far 
more complex. With modernity things have changed and we cannot talk 
of the same form of communitarianism any more. Bodunrin thus criticises 
the idea of looking to the past for evidence of African-ness. He believes 
that no country can use past ideologies in a modern setting. Mbiti himself 
points to this change in society, when discussing how isolated the indi-
vidual becomes when moving to a big city, as a result of modernity. This 
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indicates the rapid change in society; which started to take place in the 
beginning of colonisation. Even though Mbiti refers to this change in so-
ciety, where all Africans do not necessarily live in traditional villages 
anymore, he still continues to expand on his philosophy rooted in the 
concept of ‘village-life’. Nevertheless, Mbiti chooses not to discuss this 
point further, where Bodunrin sees this change in the African society, as 
being crucial for the change of the concept of Africa and therefore, Afri-
can Philosophy. 
 
Both Mbiti and Abraham share an essentialist view on African culture, 
being that African culture has a distinct and fixed essence, seeing that the 
underlying beliefs and values are fundamental and stable. At the core of 
this essential, African culture, is the notion of shared values, which im-
plies a communitarian view of the individual and society. Abraham ac-
knowledges the existence of both communalism and individualism, 
whereas Mbiti mostly advocates for communitarianism.  To both philoso-
phers however, it is communitarianism that marks the uniqueness of Afri-
can culture. This is an extension of Négritude thought, where the African 
had a need to proclaim its uniqueness to the West and in the process dis-
cover, or re-discover its own identity. 
 
In contrast to this view embraced by authors in the 1960s, what we see in 
the texts from the 1980s is a tendency to move away from the notion of 
communitarianism. Instead we find African unity expressed in another 
way. Bodunrin suggests a unity amongst Africans, founded in a shared 
historical past, which thereby gives them a sense of solidarity throughout 
the continent. Nevertheless, Bodunrin says that there has never been any 
form of continental communitarianism in Africa, as he says that colonisa-
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tion would not have been possible if the different cultures of Africa were 
fundamentally linked.  
 
5.2 What is philosophy? 
In the 1960s, both Mbiti and Abraham’s view of philosophy automati-
cally becomes a shared activity, due to communitarianism. Mbiti would 
therefore say that not only is he a part of the very society he is describing; 
he is thus participating in the creation of this communal philosophy. As 
Mbiti, philosophers like Bodunrin and Hountondji are merely products of 
the community in which they live and not necessarily individual thinkers. 
Abraham proposes a more individualistic approach to the subject in his 
distinction between public and private philosophy. We see that the indi-
vidual is able to philosophise on her own. However, because she is an in-
tegrated part of the society and shares the same fundamental values as the 
others, her reflections will resemble the essentialist public philosophy of 
her culture. 
 
To Mbiti and Abraham philosophy is rooted in the fundamental values 
and beliefs of a culture. Since their understanding of culture is essential-
ist, philosophy is seen as a fixed system of truths. Philosophy thus pro-
vides certain guidelines and a certain worldview to the participants of the 
society. This view on philosophy can therefore best be described as some-
thing you ‘do’. 
 
Mbiti and Abraham both have a cultural relativist understanding of phi-
losophy, in the sense that every culture has its own way of philosophiz-
ing. Abraham acknowledges that even though the way different cultures 
philosophise may differ, they most likely philosophise upon the same 
subjects. Historians would agree with this view seeing that sub-Saharan 
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tribes and peoples lived and survived under the same geographical condi-
tions and therefore their problems would be similar (Horizons, 2005).  In 
that sense, Abraham does not see African philosophy as unique and dif-
ferent from other philosophical traditions, and would look to other tradi-
tions for solutions to problems in Africa without hesitation. Mbiti on the 
other hand resolves that Africa must have a unique philosophy as it is di-
rectly related to the African religions.  
 
According to the critics  of ethno-philosophy (of which Hountondji is the 
forerunner), a distinction between a classical, systematic philosophy and 
a more anthropological and folk oriented ‘philosophy’ must be evident. 
Indeed some of the new philosophers, emerging in the 1980s actually 
dismiss the work of ethno-philosophers to be philosophical at all. Houn-
tondji says that ethno-philosophy contributes nothing to philosophy, but 
rather imprisons African philosophy, by restricting it to a system of fixed 
thought-systems. This kind of Philosophy can not evolve and contribute 
to philosophical problems on a universal level. Nevertheless, in the texts 
chosen from the 1980s it can be seen that they have their own fixed un-
derstanding of what philosophy should be. This is rather paradoxal, see-
ing that especially Bodunrin is against the idea of philosophy being pre-
determined.  
 
This pre-set idea of philosophy presented by Hountondji and Bodunrin 
lies in the methodology of philosophy; - that it has to be rigorous, critical 
and systematic. This pre-determinism can also be seen in the very nature 
of philosophy, which they insist upon, meaning that philosophy should be 
independent from other institutions such as culture and politics. Thereby 
they are distinguishing themselves from the idea that philosophy can be 
communal, because in their opinion a philosopher has to be a detached 
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spectator. To them, philosophy is not a fixed worldview providing a per-
manent set of truths, as put forward in the discourse of the 1960s. In this 
sense it is curious that particularly Hountondji, but also Bodunrin, define 
their own rules on how philosophy should be conducted, considering that 
philosophy according to them must not be ‘fixed’.  
 
Hountondji underlines that philosophy is a theoretical, and not a practical 
discipline. It can serve as a foundation for e.g. political ideologies, but not 
for actively solving problems; philosophy cannot be ‘done’. This change 
can be seen in the light of several African states having gained independ-
ence. Hountondji and others, are now able to analyse and look critically 
upon the formation of those independent states, which were built on na-
tionalist-ideological philosophy, and analyse whether philosophy has had 
any influence at all, and in that case, what influence it has had and what 
role it can play in the future.. Seeing that post-colonial Africa has been 
far from harmonic, it seems that the political leaders with their ‘active’ 
philosophies have failed in their mission of bringing the ‘good life’ to the 
people.  
 
Furthermore, Hountondji and Bodunrin assert that philosophy cannot be a 
set system of truths as philosophy is essentially dynamic. And it cannot 
provide guidelines for a whole society because the necessary critical fea-
ture of philosophy demands a certain amount of subjectivity. This is also 
why Bodunrin dismisses the work of ethno-philosophers as philosophy. 
They only describe what they refer to as the philosophy of African cul-
ture, but fail to take a critical stance. Both Bodunrin and Hountondji dis-
cuss the importance of the African philosopher to be critical towards 
claimed philosophical statements. Philosophy is and should always be in 
motion in order for old ‘philosophies’ to develop.  Hereby Hountondji 
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and Bodunrin imply that philosophy needs to change as society changes. 
It may be asked, if certain philosophical methods and questions do not 
cross the boundaries of time? As an example one can surely refer to the 
works of Socrates or Plato who lived thousands of years ago, but are still 
very applicable today. 
 
Cultural Relativism or Universalism  
According to Bodunrin and Hountondji philosophy has to fulfil the same 
criteria everywhere in the world. What is interesting about this universal-
ist understanding of philosophy, is that it is clearly rooted in the Western 
traditional view on philosophy. 
 
Cultural relativism on the other hand, which was fiercely advocated for 
by anthropologists and later on in the Négritude movement, not only ar-
gues that other cultures may have different ways of rationalising, but also 
that these views are equally valid. It furthermore implies that the Western 
way of rationalising is also rooted in culture! This suggests that although 
the foundations of philosophy are seen as universal and neutral to culture, 
they themselves are constructions of a certain Western worldview. This 
argument can be validated by taking into consideration, that the discipline 
of philosophy was first and foremost formed and developed in Europe. If 
believing in the idea that productions of knowledge have to be viewed in 
their historical and cultural context, then philosophy in Africa and Europe 
must consequently be a result of the various culturally specific discourses 
throughout time.  
 
Looking at the history of colonialism, we see that one of the motivations 
for colonising distant land was the expansion of Western values and be-
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liefs. European culture was seen as the only just culture, and thus the cul-
ture had to be spread around the globe and become universal. Whether 
the spread of universal (European) rationalism was successful, could lead 
to a whole other discussion. However, it is obvious in the writings of 
Bodunrin and Hountondji, that they have been deeply influenced by this 
Western discourse on rationality as being universal.  
 
The idea of a culturally specific discourse, opposes Hountondji and 
Bodunrin’s wish to separate philosophy from culture and thereby create 
universal standards for philosophising, since the universalism of philoso-
phy itself seems to be of a cultural matter. Thus universalism and cultural 
relativism seems to be engaged in a deadlock, as there can be no com-
promise between the two. By including the one, one automatically ex-
cludes the other. 
 
In the development from the 1960s to the 1980s there has been a clear 
change in the perception of the concept of philosophy, which has trig-
gered the ongoing debate on the nature of the tradition of African phi-
losophy. With the influential works of especially Mbiti, the image of Af-
rican philosophy was shaped. As we see with our chosen texts from the 
1960s the primary goal lies in the very creation of this African philoso-
phy, and the production of material on African culture and philosophy.  
 
Our philosophers from the 1980s seek to battle the monopoly of ethno-
philosophy, which has been accepted as the philosophy of Africa, and the 
idea of philosophy being equal to culture. The crux of the matter in the 
1980s is, what philosophy actually is, and thus the African aspect comes 
in second. 
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 5.3 Who is a philosopher? 
If an African philosophy exists, then the question remains; who is doing 
the philosophising? The first person that originally was recognised as an 
African Philosopher was Placide Tempel (See chapter Two, p.29). Never-
theless, Abraham applies a certain amount of self-criticism by question-
ing whether African philosophers are a necessary condition to an African 
philosophy. For instance if Mbiti’s philosophy is regarded as more of a 
folk-philosophy, deriving from the beliefs of a society, then all members 
of that society are in their right a philosopher. Abraham agrees with Mbiti 
on who the philosopher is, he points out that it is still individuals who 
philosophise in a society and even though they differ on their subject mat-
ters, they are all still fundamentally the same in their beliefs.  
 
Hountondji and Bodunrin in contrast believe in the separated existence of 
individuals. Hountondji is much opposed to the idea of a communal phi-
losophy, as he believes that an African philosopher is merely an individ-
ual, originating from the African continent. He does not discuss this mat-
ter in depth however, and is mostly concerned with the task of the phi-
losopher. Yet as Hountondji and Bodunrin are both placed within the 
field of ‘Professional Philosophy’, we assume that they think a philoso-
pher must be educated. Not everyone can be a philosopher as they can in 
ethno-philosophical, communitarian philosophy. Bodunrin is not as rig-
orous as Hountondji in his definition of the African philosopher but sim-
ply says that she should base whatever it is she is philosophising about, in 
an African context. 
 
In his own article, Bodunrin discusses how he and Hountondji are seen as 
‘professional philosophers’, in accordance to Oruka’s definition of the 
different trends in African philosophy. Qualifying as a philosopher, ac-
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cording to ‘professional philosophers’, implies a need for being formally 
trained and having a universalist –philosophical view. It is especially this 
universalist view that is important to them. According to this view of the 
professional philosophers, Mbiti and Abraham cannot be recognised as 
philosophers, because the philosophies they present are culturally relative 
and cannot be universally applicable. Nevertheless, Mbiti and Abraham 
would see Bodunrin and Hountondji as merely expressing the essence of 
their own culture. However, one can ask why they still express different 
fundamental values from each other. Is it merely the rapid social and po-
litical change in Africa that has lead to the philosophers having such dif-
ferent views of each other?  
 
What sources and methods are valid when talking of African Phi-
losophy? 
We can see that the perception of which sources and methods are valid 
for philosophising upon has changed over time. In the 1960s, philoso-
phers used (European) anthropological and ethnographic methods, which 
that qualified as science in the West; nonetheless they were used in a phi-
losophical context. It may be asked if one of the reasons for this was done 
in order to present African philosophy as being unique to the philosophi-
cal tradition of the West, but just as valid!  Their methods relied primarily 
on observation of a culture, and their sources were mostly the studying of 
the language of a people. Neither Mbiti nor Abraham sees written litera-
ture as a necessity for philosophy to be present in a culture. Through their 
individual studies of different African cultures, they both see philosophy 
as being expressed through other means such as proverbs and arts.  
 
In the 1980s we can really see a development based on the methods and 
sources from the 1960s, used by philosophers like Mbiti and Abraham. 
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The philosophers of the 1980s occupied themselves with a more critical 
approach to philosophy. They are in a process of redefining the African 
philosophy, and they did this by re-examining the texts defined as African 
Philosophy up to that point in time. They dismiss the ethno-philosophical 
material as philosophical, because it is not being critical but purely de-
scriptive, seeing this as a trait that rather belongs to the discipline of an-
thropology and not philosophy. Hountondji would recognise these works 
as socio-anthropological works, but not as philosophical. Many philoso-
phers who took on this project of redefinition, like Bodunrin and Houn-
tondji, see the ability to be critical as being indispensable to the discipline 
of philosophy.  
 
Especially the validity of oral literature has been questioned, seeing that 
one cannot identify the source of the literature. Oral literature, like prov-
erbs and myths, can also be very historically and socially specific and 
may therefore not necessarily be applicable to the present. The philoso-
phers, who criticise this more anthropological approach to philosophy, 
stress the importance of written material, which is originally a Western 
tradition. Yet according to some historians a number of African societies 
especially in the North, but also in West and East Africa were indeed lit-
erate before they met the West (Horizons, 2005). Of course this does not 
change the discussion of texts as a necessary condition for philosophy but 
it does show that philosophical texts are not only of Western origin.  
 
Bodunrin does not say that one should completely disregard traditional 
oral literature. For if one insists that philosophy must be written down, it 
means that philosophy as a discipline has been pre-defined and cannot 
evolve. It is a paradox however, seeing that Bodunrin puts his own set 
criteria on what philosophy should be (being critical towards written or 
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non-written texts), but at the same time he says philosophy should not be 
set. Hountondji too questions the validity of oral literature, but stresses 
the importance of written literature should not be overlooked.  
 
Hountondji defines African philosophy as the literature written by Afri-
cans. He does not disregard religion, but puts emphasis on the importance 
of a philosophy to be written down and clearly articulated. Inspired by 
traditional thought, but relying on the sources and methods founded in 
Western discourse, Hountondji seems to be open to the creation of a 
unique ‘African Philosophy’, but one that can be universal all the same. 
Yet again, it seems that even though Hountondji is hostile towards more 
ethnographic or anthropological philosophy, he proposes a compromise 
between the African-Relativist and Western-Universal discourses. As we 
discussed earlier, a compromise seems somewhat contradicting, as the 
acceptance of the one automatically excludes the other. 
 
5.4 What is the task of the African philosopher? 
The task of the African philosopher has developed parallel to the changes 
that have taken place within African Philosophy. In its early stages as a 
written discipline, it seemed that the task of the philosopher was to justify 
that Africans, like Europeans, have rational systems of thought. The pre-
existing Western discourse of Africans being pre-rational and a-historic, 
as brought on by people like Hegel and Lévy- Bruhl (See p.23), entailed a 
need for Africans to justify themselves as being capable of rational 
thought and being in possession of a history. More than this, the Africans 
wanted a place in history and humanity, after many years of colonial op-
pression and slavery.  
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Mbiti tried to show the unique rationality of the African mind. In accor-
dance to this process of justification towards the West, Mbiti and Abra-
ham perhaps also felt the need for a validation of the rationality of the Af-
rican mind. Abraham then expanded on the task of the philosopher, in ac-
cordance to his essentialist view on culture, by seeing it as uniting phi-
losophy with other disciplines such as economics and politics.  
 
Therefore what was important in the 1960s was to find a way of collect-
ing evidence of this philosophy that they claimed already existed, and ex-
press it in writing for the world to see. However at the same time they 
were inspired by the wave of cultural relativism, brought about by the 
Négritude movement, they took pride in showing that even though they 
were rational, they were still unique and particularly African. The politi-
cal debate in Africa in the 1960s was very much influenced by the 
movement of black consciousness around the world (like the Harlem 
Renaissance and civil rights movement in the USA), which had eventu-
ally led to the abolishment of colonialism and the right for Africans to 
control their own land. 
 
When African philosophers concerned themselves with philosophy on a 
meta-level in the 1980s, it entailed that they started to look critically to-
wards their own discipline, and the whole trend of anthropologically in-
spired philosophy.  
We can interpret this change of focus in many ways. A way of viewing 
this change of direction within the field of African philosophy could be 
that many of the influential African philosophers were educated in West-
ern universities, and have therefore probably been influenced by the 
Western analytical tradition. One could say that there was fundamentally 
still a need for acceptance from the West, but that this need has changed 
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from being about justifying themselves as a people, to justifying their dis-
cipline of philosophy. This is because the West could still not accept the 
idea of a unique philosophy in the African context as equally valid, since 
the Western definition of philosophy is concerned with universalism. One 
historian, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, has even claimed that the depiction of Af-
rica as a space of lack, absence, the not-, is merely a projection of deep 
European anxiety about its own lack into Africa (Horizons, 2005:45)36.  
 
The task of the philosopher has also changed on the political scene from 
the 1960s to the 1980s, as we can see expressed in the texts of both Abra-
ham and Hountondji. Whereas Abraham sees the task of the philosopher 
to be the unity of philosophy and other disciplines, Hountondji explicitly 
insists that philosophy should be seen as an independent discipline. How-
ever Philosophy could still be used as a foundation onto which other dis-
ciplines can build. In opposition to Abraham, Hountondji believes that 
one should not look for answers of a practical nature in philosophy, and 
Bodunrin shares his view that philosophy should be separated from po-
litical theory.  
Seeing that they are discussing African philosophy on a meta-level, the 
subject of the expectations and responsibility of the African philosopher, 
naturally becomes a more openly discussed topic in the 1980s than in the 
1960s.  
 
Africa came across challenges brought about by modernity, such as the 
change of setting from the communal life in the villages, to individualism 
in the cities. As discussed earlier, this also brought about a great deal of 
                                                 
36 Zeleza underlines that he owes this point of view to Wambui Mwangi, based on 
personal communication between the two of them on February 18th 2004 (Horizons, 
2005).  
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criticism from philosophers like Hountondji and Bodunrin, who do not 
believe that communitarianism is applicable in such a modern society. 
More importantly that it does not qualify to even be called philosophy.   
 
Bodunrin acknowledges the battle between traditional and modern 
thought in Africa. In contrast to Abraham, who in the 1960s believes that 
the unity of the whole of Africa through their shared history is the best 
possible future. Bodunrin however, recommends freeing the Africans 
from the shared history that was once their strength, and instead focus on 
the future, as he does not believe in basing modern societies on past tradi-
tional systems. This is seen in connection to the fact that, as we have ear-
lier stated, Bodunrin believes that there is a shared past that unites Africa. 
But freeing Africa from this past is what he feels is the task at hand for 
the philosophers.  
 
In the 1960s it seems that African philosophy was mostly concerned with 
the differences brought by the thoughts of cultural relativism in Négri-
tude. Whereas in the 1980s, it becomes less important for Africa to prove 
the differences between them and the West, and they concentrate more on 
the similarities of the two discourses. From this perspective one can ask if 
the difference is just a matter of emphasis, since African philosophy is 
essentially made up from both these views, and thereby include both uni-
versalist and cultural relativist theories.  
 
5.5 Where does ‘African Philosophy’ take place? 
The debate on African philosophy is of an idealistic character as it deals 
with African identity and the question of which direction African phi-
losophy should go in order to develop. Both Hountondji and Bodunrin 
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advocate for the new generation of philosophers to work with subjects 
relevant for them today and stop continuously looking at the past. There-
fore one could expect the debate to merely take place within Africa.  
 
When considering the materials written on African philosophy we see an 
inclination towards a Western audience in trying to define African-ness. 
Hountondji has pointed out that because it was anthropologists such as 
Tempels who started to define Africa and African-ness, African Philoso-
phy as a discipline has from the beginning been on the premises of the 
West. He sees a problem in the way the nature of African Philosophy has 
evolved from a Western point of view when African philosophers such as 
Mbiti use Tempel’s ideas. The result is that African philosophers are 
merely building on European ideas and are consequently dependant on 
them.  
 
The debate on the nature of rationality has a tendency to take place in 
academic milieus, primarily between African philosophers educated in 
Europe and America, who are continuously referring to each other. This 
means that they are all in some sense ‘products’ of the West, i.e. they are 
trained in the Western discourse and the methodology of the West.  
 
The target group of the philosophical literature does not seem to be the 
masses, but rather other intellectuals of primarily Western and African 
nationality. The philosophers refer to the continent in very broad terms 
and debate on the notion of Africa as a whole. They seem to be in danger 
of being captured in the very discourse they are trying to defy. With Mbiti 
and Abraham this comes to show when they are trying to return to some 
of the traditional African values, and at the same time publish their work 
in the English language. This is thought provoking because the philoso-
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phers are making use of a language (English, French) that represents the 
discourse of the culture they are trying to oppose. 
  
Seeing that all the different cultures on the African continent have differ-
ent languages, there has been a tendency of using English or French as 
the common language when it comes to the debate of defining African 
philosophy. There are probably several reasons why the philosophers 
have chosen to use these languages as their medium. One could be that it 
then reaches a broader audience, also across boundaries, and can there-
fore economically speaking be a better choice, (for instance it appeals to 
more publishers). A broader audience also communicates their thoughts 
to many different cultures, and thereby change the existing presupposi-
tions of Africa. Although making it possible for the African philosophers 
to address the Western discourse. 
 
African Philosophy in the present  
So where does that leave the debate today? Taking a look at a webpage, 
founded in 1995, and dedicated to African philosophy37, and its coopera-
tive webpage www.africaresource.com, add several new impressions to 
the state of African philosophy.  
 
For instance in the Journal Statement,38 the editors responsible for the 
webpage explain how the webpage is established in order to a) promote 
studies of African and African Diaspora philosophy on a global level, b) 
provide a forum for discussions of African philosophical issues, c) assist 
colleagues worldwide in teaching African and African Diaspora philoso-
phy, d) to produce a journal, and e) host conferences where the issues of 
                                                 
37 http://www.africanphilosophy.com/ - Friday 26/05/2006, 10.01 
38 http//www.africanphilosophy.com/statement.htm - Friday 26/05/2006, 10.02 
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African and African Diaspora philosophy can be discussed (Africanphi-
losophy.com).  
 
The editors also explain how the webpage was founded as a response to 
what they think is a misunderstanding of African philosophy, which took 
place in North America and Europe (Africanphilosophy.com). The web-
page therefore, is a tool to discuss and establish the nature of African phi-
losophy. Thereby it is evident that the technological developments and 
globalisation have become important assistants in establishing African 
philosophy as a discipline, not only in Africa, but worldwide.  
 
As readers of the webpage, we see two changes that have taken place 
since the articles in the 1980s by Bodunrin and Hountondji.  
Firstly, the editors if the webpage does not find philosophical articles on 
the background history and origin of African philosophy to be important. 
Rather they encourage articles, which investigate themes within African 
philosophy that are relevant in ‘societal’ matters, and which touch upon 
other ‘sub-divisions’, such as law, politics, human rights etc. (Africanphi-
losophy.com). Which implies that they have, to a certain extent, moved 
on from trying to define African Philosophy as a discipline? 
Secondly, the editors assess that they would gladly publish articles writ-
ten in African languages and other languages of foreign origin that are 
dominating, yet they lack the resources to do so (Africanphiloso-
phy.com).  
 
In this sense, though, it seems as if the African languages and themes 
characteristic of ethno-philosophy are experiencing a revival, after the 
harsh critique it received in the 1980’s. Yet they are now closely related 
to an African philosophy that plays a very active role in for instance mat-
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ters of human rights and law, (Africanphilosophy.com). I.e. A Philoso-
phical Look at the Jurisprudential39 Analysis of Yoruba Proverbs (Afri-
canphilosophy.com x), and Human Rights – A Philosophical Analysis of 
Indigenous Yoruba, Contemporary Nigerian and Universal Ideas (Afri-
canphilosophy.com x).  We are curious if this re-evaluation of the task of 
the philosopher may be rooted in the fact that Africa’s social and political 
problems have remained unresolved or escalated. Could this re-evaluation 
of relativism and universalism, be channelled into a more constructive 
genre of philosophy? 
 
The theme of universalism and cultural relativism is still being debated. 
For instance, the first topic of discussion that can be seen on Overview of 
the Conference (vii), is Universalism vs. Relativism in Human Rights (Af-
ricanphilosophy.com) vii). And on Presenter, Abstracts, and Papers (x) 
we see that nearly all the titles of submissions share a universal and/or 
cultural relativist headline; i.e. Ensuring effective Promotion of Minority 
Rights through a Cultural Relativist Approach (Africanphilosophy.com, 
x); or Towards Universal Morality (Africanphilosophy.com, xi).   
 
What we can conclude from this is that Hountondji’s prediction that Afri-
can philosophy cannot play an active role in matters other than philoso-
phy has not come true – yet. This is not to say that in a decade or two Af-
rican philosophers will look back and say that it was a mistake to think 
that African philosophy could be of any assistance in solving e.g. political 
problems. But as it looks now, African philosophers (diasporas and non-
diasporas) are struggling hard to be of assistance in solving these very 
problems, and they are not afraid to draw on ethno-philosophy in doing 
                                                 
39 Jurisprudential meaning something that is knowable in for instance the philosophy 
of law.  
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that. The answer to this would perhaps be that the new African philoso-
phers have read the ethno-philosophical literature from the 1960’s and 
know of the critique it received in the 1980’s, and have now re-
interpreted it in their own way, so that it can be of practical use.  
 
These two web-pages, Africanphilosophy.com and africaresource.com 
gives the impression of an African philosophy that takes an active part in 
shaping African and establishing itself as a discipline on a global level.  
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Chapter Six - Reflection   
 
 
6.1 Source criticism 
In this chapter we wish to critically discuss the sources we have used in 
the project, when collecting knowledge about the nature of African Phi-
losophical thought. Though we have continuously tried to be critical to-
wards the literature we have used, for example by trying to check if the 
same information was obtainable from parallel sources, we still wish to 
critically discuss certain relevant issues and the implications of these fur-
ther.  
 
It is most likely that the sources we have used not all share the same de-
gree of credibility. We were (and still are perhaps) unfamiliar with the 
academic environment in which the debates on the subject of African Phi-
losophy takes place and consequently we may have misjudged the credi-
bility of a certain source, like for example a journal or magazine. 
  
Nevertheless, one of the most important issues we have had to come to 
terms with is the fact that we claim that the four texts, we have analysed 
and discussed all belong to the same tradition - African Philosophy. Yet, 
this is somewhat of a paradox seeing that some of these very authors deny 
this label of philosophy. They argue that the texts presented as ethno-
philosophy, written in the 1960s more likely represent the tradition of 
ethnology or anthropology than philosophy. We consequently had to 
choose if we consider the texts to belong to the tradition according to 
which they have been labelled – anthropology; or whether they belong to 
the tradition in which context they were written- philosophy? We have 
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thus chosen to deal with the texts in accordance to the latter. This is due 
to our interest in the ontological evolution of African Philosophy and our 
stance that it is not up to us to pass judgement on what qualifies as Afri-
can philosophy or not. 
 
It is difficult to question every piece of information used.  We have tried 
only to use sources, which have been published in a publication series 
that we, to the extent of our knowledge, found to be scientific40 and 
credible.  
An important point to notice concerns the very publications of the Afri-
can philosophers, which we have used as both primary and secondary ma-
terial. Either European or American publishers publish a majority of the 
material of African Philosophy. The question has to be asked as to how 
much the authors used in our project have been influenced by the domi-
nant discourse present in these countries. Furthermore has this affected 
their works in favour of the dominating Western discourse and can it 
therefore be legitimately claimed that they are representative of African 
thought? Most of the material is written by Africans (even though many 
of them live in diasporas), which leads back to the discussion of how to 
define somebody as African? Is it something pure geographical, rather 
mental or biological?  
 
After having criticised, the ‘African-ness’ that our sources are claiming to 
possess we wish to draw attention to the profile of the writers, whom we 
have used as our sources.  
                                                 
40 Note that the mere fact that we label reliable material as “scientific”, shows how 
dominated we are by the western academic tradition. This is discussed further in the 
Theory of Science chapter.  
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The majority of the writers was born in Africa, and has obtained a degree 
at a university in the African continent41. Following this, many have con-
tinued their studies at universities in Europe and America and have also 
resided there for long periods of time, even though many of them today 
have returned to their native lands as for instance P. Hountondji. When 
considering the educational and social status of these philosophers, we 
think that we can possibly allow ourselves to speak of an academic elite. 
This African academic elite either live overseas or are presumably living 
with a high social status in the African countries where they reside. Is it 
then fair to say that these people justly represent the average African citi-
zen? Are they able to represent the views of the masses, when they phi-
losophise on the nature of African thought and its future, when not even 
living in Africa or not having to deal with the same problems that the av-
erage uneducated African have to deal with on a daily basis? Or are they 
merely part of a new generation of educated Africans who in their own 
way try to contribute to the problems of culture and nationality, politics 
and morals in a time where the African continent is faced with rapid, but 
crucial change? 
  
We also need to take into consideration if certain statements writers 
might have made at a certain time, was of specific significance in the his-
torical timeframe in which it was written. Also it should be remembered 
that certain postulates might have been considered proper and reliable at 
the time they were written, and that this might have changed over time.  
 
Because the subject of African Philosophy was a completely unexplored 
research area for all of us, and because of the complexity of the nature of 
African philosophy and the fact that we still do not know everything con-
                                                 
41 See Appendix A  
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cerning this tradition, we cannot help questioning if the philosophers cho-
sen, have provided us with a valid overview of the tradition of African 
thought?  Have Abraham, Mbiti, Hountondji and Bodunrin shown to be 
symptomatic of their time? It can never be assured if these authors have 
been able to provide a proper overview of the tendencies in this field, or 
even if these specific tendencies are the ones we should be concerning 
ourselves with? Nevertheless, the answer must be that even though the 
views of the authors on certain issues are nuanced, we find them satisfac-
tory representatives of the historic eras in which their texts have been 
written. However we do find the works of Abraham being rather ahead of 
his time. Perhaps it is due to his educational background as a philosopher 
that he seems to approach the crucial matters of the nature of African phi-
losophy in a both complex and foreseeing manner.  
 
This brings us to taking a critical look at the authors we have relied on in 
our historical chapter. When considering the validity of our project as a 
whole, we ask ourselves if it in retrospect was a good decision to have 
chosen the texts for our analysis according to two time periods? In doing 
so, did we limit ourselves in discovering the true nature of African Phi-
losophy, by having been obliged to dismiss several interesting or impor-
tant objects for analysis? Moreover what would our results have looked 
like if we had chosen a different timeframe perhaps or even none at all? 
Or chosen other philosophical texts by other philosophers? We are never-
theless satisfied with the timeframe we have chosen, though, seeing that it 
has provided us a good understanding of the way the nature of African 
philosophy has changed in the course of the decades.     
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6.2 Theory of Science 
Seeing that we are writing a project, which primarily concerns itself with 
philosophical questions, it seems obvious for us to try to reflect on our-
selves as researchers, and the influence we may have exercised on the 
project as a whole.  
This calls for an in-depth self-reflection upon our methodological strat-
egy.  
With this project we ventured into a new knowledge-gaining experience, 
having to start from scratch without any prior understanding of the sub-
ject and only having little knowledge on European philosophy. 
 
On a meta-level, it is clear that hermeneutics is present in our entire re-
port; we use it as a method for analysing the philosophical texts and addi-
tionally we claim that the African philosophers also make use of herme-
neutics42. We can also say that the whole evolution of African philoso-
phy, up until today, has been a hermeneutic process in itself. It seems as 
if African philosophers (as well as others who have participated in creat-
ing this tradition), have interpreted various works, or even various dis-
courses, in their own way, resulting in the product of an ever-developing 
field of African Philosophy up to the present. It is important to note how-
ever, that we, ourselves also have made use of hermeneutics in that same 
way as we interpret the philosophical texts and create new meanings in-
fluenced by our historical context and worldviews.   
 
 So, an illustration of how the hermeneutic circle is present on a meta-
level in our report is how we, as researchers, have approached the phi-
losophers.  
                                                 
42 See chapter two on Hermeneutics 
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In order to understand the meaning(s) of the philosophers’ texts, the phi-
losophers must be understood from within. First of all, we collected 
background information about the philosophers, such as where they were 
born and educated. Secondly acquiring background knowledge about the 
historical frame of African philosophy was necessary in order to place it 
within a historical and sociological context. Our hypothesis was that add-
ing a historical perspective would enable us to better understand the phi-
losophers and their arguments; not only in the present, but also as prod-
ucts of their time making us able to contextualise the philosophers by us-
ing a historical framework. As such we engaged in a hermeneutic ap-
proach in order to interpret the philosophers meaningfully.  
 
This process of gaining knowledge could even have been taken to another 
level. The historical aspect we present in the report is only a small part of 
Africa’s history. For instance we could have looked even further into the 
history of the specific countries which the four philosophers origin from 
in order to elaborate even more on that in the analysis and the discussion. 
We could also have looked closer at the political and social circumstances 
in the above-mentioned countries in respectively the 1960s and the 1980s, 
and maybe that would have given us another perspective on why the phi-
losophers philosophize as they did?  
 
It is very important that we also look critically at ourselves as researchers. 
Our roles as researchers are influenced by the majority of us being of 
European origin and thereby having an entire knowledge-system, rooted 
in Western discourse. 
When investigating the different epistemological theories presented in the 
chosen texts, we had to stop and take into consideration if we, the sup-
posedly objective researchers, are not just prisoners of this very hegem-
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ony of Western discourse? When we for instance reflected upon the 
methodologies43 used by Mbiti and Abraham, were we at all exercising 
judgment on whether or not their works are valid as philosophical mate-
rial, or even just as scientific research material? Maybe we have not been 
critical enough when examining the postulates, which form a part of the 
Western discourse? When we label the analysed texts from the 1980s as 
reliable44 due to their criticism on ethno-philosophy, we should be careful 
not to immediately define them as being valid; as it all is a matter of what 
the individual perceives as being the nature of African philosophy.  
 
Another important aspect is that we acknowledge the fact that we are stu-
dents currently on our second year at university. Therefore we are not 
trained philosophers in an academic sense, which may or may not entail a 
lack in our understanding of the philosophers, because we do not have an 
in-depth insight into philosophical definitions, concepts and methods etc., 
on the same level as trained philosophers.  
It is also necessary to understand that, as we acquire more knowledge, 
historically, philosophically and socially etc., we continuously find new 
meanings in the texts of the four philosophers.  
 
Radnitzky (1970) claims that once one has engaged in the process of 
gaining knowledge, one can never return to the ‘absolute beginning’. This 
implies that because we have now attained knowledge on the nature of 
African philosophy, this will forever be a part of us as researchers, and 
that we can never look at African philosophy as we did in the very begin-
                                                 
43 Here we refer to that they for example make use of the analysis of proverbs, in or-
der to make a generalised epistemological statement, which is not necessarily solid 
according to certain scientific views.  
44 ‘Reliable’ is understood as something that refers to a degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the 
same observer on different occasions (Silverman 2001:225).  
 83
ning of the project. We can never disregard the knowledge we have at-
tained and this means that whenever we would start on a new project or 
other knowledge-gaining experience, we will interpret the new informa-
tion, with foreknowledge on African philosophy or any other related mat-
ter, which will presumably influence the forthcoming results and mean-
ings.  
 
Thus we can conclude that we, the researchers, are and have always been 
part of the hermeneutic circle in our quest to present the field of African 
philosophy in a meaningful way.   
 
6.3 Group Process 
We started out six people with a shared interest in writing a project about 
African philosophy. After spending a great deal of time finding relevant 
literature amongst other places visiting the African studies department at 
KU (Copenhagen University), we found that our topic was not so easy to 
unravel as expected. We quickly learned that there was no such thing as a 
fixed body of African philosophy, but more an ongoing debate on the 
topic.  
 
We then decided to look into one of the African philosophers, who we 
consider to be influential, Ifeanyi Menkiti. Focusing on one of his texts, 
we wanted to look at a specific subject within African philosophy, the 
subject of communitarianism and individualism. We soon realized 
though, that this was not an obvious focus when dealing with African phi-
losophy, as there were still so many unresolved questions as to what phi-
losophy actually is.  
After this discovery, there was a long period of reading including the 
careful selection of relevant material. This was a very difficult process, as 
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the subject of African philosophy is rather limited in sources. And since 
we started from scratch, not knowing anything on the subject of African 
philosophy, it was hard for us to unravel who the really important people 
of the debate were. After a small problem of conflicting interests, where 
the group considered splitting up, we soon found a common interest 
again. We decided to analyze texts on the subject of African philosophy 
as examples of the debate, two texts from the 1960s and two from the 
1980s. This was in order to put the debate into context  and to look at the 
debate from a historical perspective. After finding and choosing four 
texts, the process of writing slowly kicked off, and developed into indi-
vidual writings as well as writings done jointly in the group.  
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Chapter Seven – Conclusion  
 
 
Our cardinal question is concerned with what the nature of African Phi-
losophy is? In order to answer this, we found one of the key issues of dis-
cussion to be whether one can speak of a unified African philosophy, 
given the many differences in cultures and languages that one finds in this 
vast continent. Although the discipline of African philosophy is very 
much alive, it does not have an all-together fixed essence. Neither the 
meaning of the prefix ‘African’ nor the concept of ‘Philosophy’ has been 
agreed upon. 
 
 The unification of African philosophy can neither be found in its meth-
ods or its subjects, nor can it be found in a specific cultural or a specific 
geographical framework. Looking at the debate one could easily get the 
impression that African philosophy is far from unified. However, this 
need not be of defining importance. The unification of African philoso-
phy rather seems to be found in the many differences and the changes that 
continuously occur. ‘African philosophy’ exists because disputes on its 
nature exist; the debate has been formed by the many different African 
philosophers throughout time, who have built a distinct philosophy on the 
works of each other. 
 
One of the important discoveries about African philosophy is that it is 
neither related to the preconceived ideas of what is ‘African’, nor to what 
we thought ’Philosophy’ was. African philosophy cannot solely be re-
duced to the African continent and its inhabitants. Its emergence can be 
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seen as the product of the clash between Africa and the West and as a re-
sponse to the legacy of colonialism.  
In this context, as we have discovered in our analysis, African philosophy 
becomes especially relevant to the time frame in which it occurs and 
which we have investigated it in. This makes our hypothesis that there 
has been a significant development throughout the two decades true. 
Looking at the material produced in the 1960's and the 1980's we see a 
change in the understanding of and approach to philosophy. It is a change 
that becomes more apparent taking into consideration the political and 
social conditions of the historical context. Due to the change in the per-
ception on philosophy that has occurred, a change in the view upon the 
task of philosophy and the African philosopher is evident. 
 
In contemporary philosophical discussions, there especially seems to be a 
preoccupation with the practicality of philosophy, what philosophy can 
and should be used for. Hountondji advocates that philosophy cannot play 
an active role and provide ready-made solutions for actual societal issues. 
This however, seems as a feature yearned for in contemporary African 
philosophy. This can for instance be seen in the establishment of a 
seminar45 on human rights in relation to African philosophy. Here, the 
issue of universalism and cultural relativism is still debated, which makes 
the discussion on the definition of rationality and philosophy still relevant 
today. 
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Resume 
 
 
I dette projekt har vi dækket dimensionen Videnskab og Filosofi, og der-
ved forsøgt at redegøre for afrikansk filosofis ontologiske væren. Ved 
brug af hermeneutiske metoder, har vi analyseret tekster fra fire udvalgte 
afrikanske filosofer. Vi har udvalgt disse tekster fra to forskellige årtier 
1960erne og 1980erne. Dette har vi gjort for at kunne relatere afrikansk 
filosofi til Afrikas historiske baggrund, og derved kunne diskutere den 
udvikling debatten har taget. Fra 1960 erne; John Mbiti´s African relig-
ions and philosophy(1968) og W.E. Abraham´s in the mind of Af-
rica(1962). Fra 1980 erne The question of African Philosophy by P.O. 
Bodunrin (1981) and Myth and reality by Paul Hountondji (1987).  
 
 
 88
 Bibliography 
 
 
Abraham, W.E. 1962. The mind of Africa. London: Weidenfield and 
Nicolson  
Bodunrin, P.O. 1981. The question of African Philosophy. In Philoso-
phy: The Royal Institute of Philosophy, No. 56 
Dilthey, Wilhelm 1996. Hermeneutics and the Study of History. (ed. 
Makkreel, Rudolf A.). Princeton University Press.  
Eze, E. Chukwudi. 1997. Modern Western Philosophy and African Colo-
nialism.  
 Printed in African Philosophy – An anthology. Eze, E. Chuk-
wudi (Ed.) 1998. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Falola, Toyin. 2002. Key Events in African History: A reference guide.  
Greenwood Publishing Group 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1989 2nd edition, Truth and Method, Sheed &  
Ward Ltd and The Crossroad Publishing Company 
Gyekye, Kwame, 1987, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The  
Akan Conceptual Scheme; Cambridge University Press 
Hallen, Barry. 2002. A Short History of African Philosophy. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 
Hountondji, P. 1976. African Philosophy – myth and reality.  
       London: Hutchinson Publishing Group 
Hountondji, P. 1987 What Philosophy can do. In Quest Vol. 1 No. 2  
Irele, F. A. 1998. African philosophy, Francophone. In E. Craig (Ed.), 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge 
Retrieved May 21, 2006, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Z013  
 89
Jones, R. 1988-2003. http://www.philosopher.org.uk. Retrieved May 25 
2006 
Kvale, Steinar, 1997, InterView – En Introduktion til det Kvalitative In-
terview, Hans Reitzels Forlag 
Masolo, D. A. 1994. African Philosophy in Search of Identity. Blooming-
ton and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.  
Moran, Dermot, 1999, Introduction to Phenomenology. Routledge. 
Okonkwo, R. L. 1978. Cultural Nationalism in the Colonial Period. 
Printed in African Philosophy – An anthology. Eze, E. Chuk-
wudi (Ed.) 1998. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Oruka, H.O. 1990. Trends in contemporary African Philosophy 
 Nairobi 
Radnitzky, Gerard. 1970. Contemporary Schools of Metascience. Vol II 
Lund: Berlingska Boktryckeriet 
Sheehan, Thomas. 2003. Heiegger, Martin. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge 
 Retrieved May 29, 2006, from 
 http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD027 
Sumner, Claude. 1998. Ethiopia, philosophy in. In E. Craig (Ed.), 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge 
 Retrieved May 29, 2006, from 
 http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Z016SECT
Wiredu, Kwasi (Ed.). 2004. A companion to African Philosophy. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
Wright, John S. 1998. Amo, Anton Wilhelm. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.  
 Retrieved May 29, 2006, from 
 http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Z001 
 90
Zeleza, Paul Tyiambe; Africa: The Changing Meanings of “African” Cul-
ture and Identity; Printed in Horizons: Perspectives on Global 
Africa; E. Abriri; H. Thörn, 2005, Lund: Studentlitteratur 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
http://www.africanphilosophy.com/ (Retrieved 27th May 2006) 
http://www.africaresource.com/conferences/index.php?cf=1 (Retrieved 
27th May 2006)   
 
 
 
 
 91
Appendix A 
Author Backgrounds 
 
The four texts we have chosen to be the focus of our analysis, has primar-
ily been selected on the basis of the authors, who have been significantly 
prominent within the debate of African philosophy, but also on the sub-
jects discussed within their article or book. In collaboration with our time 
frame, we have chosen two persons from the 1960s, John Mbiti and Wil-
liam Abraham; and two persons from the 1980s, Peter O. Bodunrin and 
Paulin J. Hountondji. They all come from different African countries and 
they each seem to have a unique (although similar in some cases) ap-
proach to the idea of African philosophy. In the following chapter, each 
text will be analysed according to hermeneutic principles, the result of 
which we will use for further discussion. 
 
John Mbiti46 is a religious philosopher and an ordained Anglican priest. 
He was born in Kenya, but was educated in both Uganda and the United 
States and has a doctorate in theology, from the University of Cambridge 
in the United Kingdom. Mbiti was teaching in Makerere University when 
he wrote his book African religions and philosophy (1969). It is based on 
massive field work where he interprets traditional African religions from 
a Christian perspective. He sees religion as being an inseparable part of 
African culture and subsequently argues that religion is also philosophy 
in the African context. He has asserted himself in a wide field of disci-
plines such as philosophy, theology and literature. We could constitute 
during our research that even today, more than 37 years after his book 
                                                 
46 Information on Mbiti obtained from his own book African religions and philosophy 
(1969), as well as the publisher’s (Heinemann) homepage: 
http://books.heinemann.com/authors/587.aspx Retrieved May 25 2006.  
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was first published, Mbiti’s African religions and philosophy (1969) is 
still very much discussed in various academic fields.  
Mbiti left Uganda for Switzerland in 1974, where he served as director of 
the ‘Ecumenical Institute Bossey’, of the World Council of Churches. He 
has been a visiting professor at various universities in Europe, America, 
Canada and Australia. At the moment he teaches at the University of 
Bern and is a parish minister in Burgdorf, Switzerland. (He is married to 
Verena and they have four children: Kyeni, Maria, Esther and Kavata.) 
hehe I just had to include that… 
 
William E. Abraham47 was born in 1934 in Nigeria. His parents were 
from Ghana and Abraham consequently obtained a degree from the Uni-
versity of Ghana. Afterwards, he went to Oxford University, England to 
study for his post graduate degree. Abraham has travelled extensively in 
South-east Asia, Europe and America, teaching at various Universities, 
including Oxford, Ghana, Stanford, and California. He has further held 
fellowships including at All Souls College, Oxford, Rockefeller, and the 
Stanford Hoover Institution.  
Abraham was Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Ghana, when he wrote in 1962. Today Abraham is an emeritus professor, 
who main publications were The Mind of Africa (1962) He has also pub-
lished other articles on African philosophy and culture, he has further-
more also concerned himself with topics and figures in Greek philosophy. 
Abraham has also held several civic positions, including chairmanship of 
national committees and membership of the first Presidential Commission 
of Ghana.  
 
                                                 
47 Information on W.E. Abraham has been obtained from Abraham’s own book The 
mind of Africa (1962) as well as A Companion to African Philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu 
(ed.) 
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Peter O. Bodunrin’s interest in the debate on African philosophy came 
naturally, as he was a university philosophy teacher in African and Amer-
ica. At first he did not join in on the debate, because he found it useless 
that he had to teach and write about something simply by discussing 
whether or not it existed:  If there is African Philosophy, do it rather than 
talk endlessly about it (www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Afri/AfriMaki.htm, 07-
05-2006, 15:02).  One of the things that make Bodunrin interesting is his 
significant critique of Odera Oruka’s four trends of African Philosophy, 
which is also seen in The Question of African Philosophy (1981). Bodun-
rin (1981) has expressed that denying a people philosophy is to say that 
they are intellectually inferior to those who have one, meanwhile he criti-
cize ethno-philosophers for trying to romanticize about the past.  Bodun-
rin died on April the 23rd 1997.  
 
Paulin Hountondji48 was born in Abidjan. He was educated in Paris 
has spent a few years in politics, where he was involved in the process of 
democratisation of Benin as Minister of Education and Minister for Cul-
ture and Communications.49 Hereafter Hountondji returned to the Na-
tional University of Benin as a teacher. Today he is a Professor of Phi-
losophy at the University of Cotonou, Benin and Director of the African 
Center for Advanced Studies in Porto-Novo in Benin.  The article we use 
by Hountondji is called What philosophy can do and was printed in the 
journal Quest in 1987, an acclaimed journal for publications by and for 
African philosophers. Some of his further publications include his re-
                                                 
48 Information on Hountondji was primarily obtained from Barry Hallen’s A short his-
tory of African philosophy (2002) as well as A Companion to African Philosophy, 
Kwasi Wiredu (ed.) 
49 retrieved 27th of may 2006 from: http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=36198&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
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nowned book African Philosophy, Myth and Reality (1984)50 as well as 
other books and articles which were mainly written in French. Hountondji 
is famous for his critique of ethno-philosophy, which he sees as not being 
qualified to be called philosophy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
50 1984 was the year the English translation was published  
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Journal Statement 
Journal on African Philosophy is an electronic journal spon-
sored by the International Society for African Philosophy and 
Studies (ISAPS) and published by Africa Resource Center, Inc. 
The Society was founded in 1995 at an inaugural conference held 
at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica. ISAPS has 
the following aims and objectives: 
(a) Promote the study of African and African Diaspora philosophy 
and studies worldwide from a broad (critical) perspective; 
(b) Provide a regular forum for discussing philosophical issues 
pertaining to African and African Diaspora politics, aesthetic sen-
sibilities, values, metaphysics and cultural traditions; 
(c) Assist colleagues and departments in practical ways with the 
teaching of African and African Diaspora philosophy and studies; 
(d) Produce an academic journal and other publications for ex-
change of ideas; 
(e) Host regional conferences to discuss issues in African and Afri-
can Diaspora philosophy and studies. 
The inauguration of this journal marks the redemption of the spe-
cific promise made in (d) above. And, in general, it provides an 
additional platform to that offered by the ISAPS annual confer-
ence, for the achievement of the aims and objectives of the soci-
ety. 
Apart from the general aims just adumbrated, there are more 
specific aims for the journal to fulfill. The sub-discipline of African 
Philosophy has been ill served not least by many of its propo-
nents. For so long back in the continent itself, it was mired in 
fruitless debates about its very possibility, and later, its philoso-
phical pedigree. But that debate was quickly undercut in places 
like Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(then know as Zaire), and Kenya. There native philosophers work-
ing out of local institutions, especially in the late seventies and 
throughout the eighties of the last century, began to put out sub-
stantive works in the sub-discipline and to produce graduates up 
to and including doctorates in Africa Philosophy. Unfortunately, as 
at 1995 when ISAPS was founded, that reality had not dawned on 
many who flew the banner of African Philosophy in North America 
and Europe. Just as ISAPS conferences have been places where, 
over the years, substantive African philosophy has been pre-
sented, we expect that Journal on African Philosophy will at-
tract substantive discussion of themes, orientations, traditions, 
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schools, and so on, in African philosophy, globally conceived. In 
short, we shall not encourage or welcome submissions treating of 
pedigree issues. Put more positively, Journal on African Phi-
losophy solicits and will publish articles and other pieces that 
treat of substantive issues/themes in African philosophy and stud-
ies. Needless to say, we shall publish good philosophical pieces 
that treat themes in the various subdivisions of the discipline in 
addition to those of African philosophy. 
Secondly, neither Journal on African Philosophy nor ISAPS, its 
sponsor, can be understood outside of the historical conjuncture 
that has spawned them. This conjuncture has different elements. 
One relates to the crisis afflicting the academic scene in many Af-
rican countries which has led to the demise of some of the jour-
nals that used to provide fora for the dissemination of research in 
African philosophy. Those that have not died enjoy only fitful exis-
tence. Thus, the scene in the sub-discipline is devoid of both Sec-
ond Order, the premier Anglophone philosophy journal and the 
pioneer in the field, and Thought and Practice, its worthy Ken-
yan counterpart. In addition, there has been an exodus of many 
labourers of African extraction from the vineyards of African phi-
losophy from the continent. Some of us have found homes in 
various non-African locations. The demise or fitful existence of 
African-based journals of philosophy does not mean that research 
is not proceeding apace at various African institutions. Indeed, the 
opposite seems to be the case. The crisis in the education sector 
in African countries has forced many continent-based philosophers 
to turn inwards and undertake "local sourcing" for many of their 
philosophical exertions in both research and teaching. 
Meanwhile, many who work in African philosophy outside of the 
continent have not stood still, either. In short, we do have at the 
present time an embarrassment of riches where interest, research 
and teaching in African philosophy are concerned. But we cannot 
say the same for outlets where this embarrassment of riches can 
be disseminated. So it is part of the goal of this journal to provide 
an outlet for the dissemination of original work within its scope 
originating from all areas of the world. 
Thirdly, we are aware of works that have been published locally in 
African journals or even anthologies that hardly enjoy any distri-
bution beyond their immediate locality. Given that outside of the 
continent, teachers are forever lamenting the paucity of materials 
to support their desire to incorporate African philosophy into their 
syllabi and the curriculum, it would be a welcome development if 
Journal on African Philosophy could make available to wider 
audiences materials locally published in Africa but which, in the 
estimation of the editors, deserve wider circulation. 
Finally, it is a bane of much work in African philosophy at the pre-
sent time that too much of its published content, especially out-
side of Africa, is general and hardly ever related to any specific 
culture, tradition, language, history, etc., within the African world. 
It is our hope that prospective contributors would be mindful of 
this shortcoming and strive to minimize its occurrence in their 
submission. As editors, if we could have our way, we'd love to 
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publish material in some African languages, including the foreign-
derived dominant languages in many countries in the African 
world. But we lack the wherewithal to realize any such wish. How-
ever, we look forward to putting out articles that deal with both 
general themes but also specific traditions, histories, cultures, 
languages, and the like, in African philosophy and studies. We in-
tend to remain sensitive to the fact that outside of those areas of 
Africa where writing enjoyed a very early presence-the Nile Valley 
and Ethiopia being the earliest-as well as the areas where Islam 
has been present for centuries, much of older African philosophy 
must be extracted from what would rank as "unusual" sources. To 
this extent, we encourage prospective contributors to not limit 
themselves to the "usual" sources. 
We look forward to serving you, dear readers, and with your help, 
we propose to present some of the best works in African philoso-
phy.  
ISAPS is a continental and diasporic philosophical society 
that supports and encourages interdisciplinary and mul-
tidisciplinary explorations of African/a life and experi-
ence.  
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HUMAN RIGHTS: AFRICANA AND MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Topics for discussion will include but are not limited to the following themes and sub-themes: 
Universalism vs. Relativism in Human Rights  
 
Indigenous Law, Legal Pluralism and Human Rights 
 
Theories of Human Rights (Marxism, Liberalism and Feminist Theory) 
 
Legal Issues (International Law, - Indigenous/Customary Law, Legal Pluralism and Self-
Determination) 
 
Health Issues and Human Rights (Circumcision, AIDS, Reproductive Rights, Pharmaceutical 
- Corporations and Drug Trials) 
 
Environmental Issues and Human Rights  
 
Economics and Human Rights (Access and Equality in Open Markets, The Philosophy and 
Politics of Poverty Reduction; The World Bank, the IMF and The Debt Burden) 
 
War Crimes and Truth & Reconciliation Commissions (International Law and War Crimes, 
Transitional Justice Philosophy, Justice and Punishment, Rwandan War Crimes & Tribunal 
and The Gulf War, etc.) 
 
Children's Rights (Street Children, Refugee Children, Children in Conflict Situations, & Ju-
venile Justice) 
 
Women's Rights (Feminist Theory, Plastic and Cosmetic Surgery, Women and Human 
Rights Law, Women Refugees, Reproductive Rights, Women's Health and Human Rights, 
Economic Freedom for Women) 
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Religious Perspectives on Human Rights. 
 
We welcome papers which do not directly address the theme or sub-themes of the conference, 
but which are relevant to African Philosophy and African Studies. The organizers therefore wel-
come the submission of abstracts on topics related to the general concerns which have come to 
define ISAPS.  
  
home | overview | program | call for papers 
submission | papers | re istrationg  | organization   
 
 
  Top 
 
 103
 Back to Previous Page | Conference Services Home    
P resented by  International Society for African Philosophy and Studies  
 
    Home > Presenters, Abstracts, and Papers 
 
 
 
 
 Presenters, Abstracts, and Papers 
 
 
Browse by: Author | Title 
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | T U | V | W | X | Y | Z | All 
 Oladele Abiodun Balogun, Dept. of Philosophy, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-
Iwoye 
A Philosophical Look at the Jurisprudential Analysis of Yoruba Proverbs
 
 Leke Adeofe, Triton College/ IVU
Communal Justice
 
 Fortune Ihua-Maduenyi, Faculty of Law, University of Leicester 
Culture and International Human Rights Law: which way forward?
 
 Lawrence Bamikole, Dept of Language, Linguistics & Phil, UWI Mona
Democracy in a Multicultural Society
 
 Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Faculty of Law, University of Ghana 
Ensuring effective Promotion of Minority Rights through a Cultural Relativist Approach
 
 Tunde BEWAJI, Language, Linguistics and Philosophy, University of the West 
Human Rights - A Philosophical Analysis of Indigenous Yoruba, Contemporary Nigerian 
and Universal Ideas
 
 Friday Ndubuisi, Dept of Philosophy, University of Lagos
Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria
 
 Wim van Binsbergen, African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands; Quest; An Afri 
Human Rights between North Atlantic Hegemony and sub-Saharan Historic Cultural 
Practices: with special reference to the Nkoya people of western central Zambia
 
 Workineh Kelbessa, Dept of Philosophy, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia 
In Search of an Ethical Response to Environmental Impacts of Globalisation
 
 Spencer James, Department of Sociology, Brigham Young University
Ivory Coast Electoral Rules and Their Bearing on the Current Crisis
 
 Max Belaise, University of Martinique 
Politics and Pentacostalism in Africa Today
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 Monika Brodnicka, PIC Program, SUNY Binghamton 
Re-centering the human in West African Sufism of Tierno Bokar Salif Tall
 
 Nkiru Nzegwu, Africana Studies, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY
Social Visions, Social Worlds and a Transformatory Language of Rights
 
 Ebunoluwa, Oluwafemi Oduwole, Dept of Philosophy, Olabisi Onabanjo University, 
Ago Iwoye 
The Idea of Fundamental Human Right in a Cultural Relative World – A Philosophical 
Appraisal
 
 Daniel Smith, Dept of Philosophy, College of Social Science, Addis Ababa 
The Universal Violation of Human Rights and Its Effect On the Normative Power of 
Such Ideals
 
 Temitope Abiodun Balogun, Dept of English, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye 
Towards a Viable Language of Human Rights Activism in Contemporary Nigeria
 
 Temisanren Ebijuwa, Philosophy, Dept of General Studies, Ladoke Akintola Univers
Towards Universal Morality
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